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ABSTRACT 
The Android platform is the fastest growing smartphone operating system to date. 
Consequently, malware on Android OS has been increasing at an alarming rate. Similar to 
Windows-based malware, Android malware also have different families which are 
responsible for different malicious activities.  
In this thesis, we focused on one particular group of Android malware which is designed to 
target banks and financial institutions.  These banking malware use different techniques to 
attack bank clients and banking servers. A coherent framework to analyse the behaviour of 
these malware needs to be developed, so the impact of theirs attacks could be minimised.  
This thesis investigates a systematic analysis to understand these malware’s behaviour and 
distribution method. From public and private sources, 37 samples of banking malware have 
been collected which represent eight major Android Banking malware families. In addition, 
we also analysed malware source code by reverse engineering all malware samples. As a 
result of analysis, a clear overview and better understanding of mobile banking malware on 
Android OS was established. The results indicated that Android banking malware is evolving 
in technique and will become more difficult to analyse in the future. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
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Android became the world’s leading smartphone platform at the end of 2010. As of 2011, 
Android has the largest installed base of any mobile OS[1] and as of 2013, its devices also sell 
more than Windows, iOS, and Mac OS devices combined.[2] As of July 2013 the Google Play 
store has had over 1 million Android apps published, and over 50 billion apps downloaded.[3] 
A developer survey conducted in April–May 2013 found that 71% of mobile developers 
develop using Android.[4] In 2014, Google revealed that there were over 1 billion active 
monthly Android users (that have been active for 30 days), up from 538 million in June 
2013.[5]  
At the same time, the number of Android mobile malware is growing significantly. In 2013, 
Kaspersky Lab detected 3,905,502 installation packages that were used by cybercriminals to 
distribute mobile malware, which contributes to overall approximately 10,000,000 unique 
malicious installation packages. Android remains a prime target for malicious attacks as 
98.05% of all malware detected by Kaspersky Lab in 2013 targeted Android OS, confirming 
both the popularity of this mobile OS and the vulnerability of its architecture.[ 6] 
While banks are profiting from online and mobile banking, so are the cyber criminals that 
target these services with highly specialized banking malware. It is observed that the 
number of banking malware on mobile channel has increased and are a dominant mobile 
malware threat.[7] Malware can be characterised by attack vectors e.g. browser exploits, 
application (e.g. PDF, office) exploits, code insertions and buffer manipulation etc.  There is 
a need to understand what  are the main attack vectors used by mobile banking malware on 
Android OS, as compared to similar attacks on internet banking, such as inserting code into 
the browser, modifying the application code, patching the network stack etc. to steal 
information, manipulate transactions or make unauthorized and fraudulent money transfers. 
In this research, a framework has been developed to systematically analyse Android 
malware targeting banks and financial institutions. Then this framework is adopted to 
analyse 37 samples, which have been collected from the security researcher community, 
both within Australia and internationally. The earliest sample was discovered in June 2011, 
and the latest was detected in May 2014.  
All samples were analysed in an isolated test environment with realistic scenarios from 
mobile banking.  Static and dynamic analysis were performed on all samples; malware 
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classes and method calls were profiled and analysed methodically. Analysis also showed 
technique evolution of some mobile banking malware families over the time. These new 
techniques were adopted to impede forensic analysis.    
In addition to systematically analysing malware binaries, analysis of the whole lifecycle of 
these Android banking malware samples was performed, including malware distribution, 
infection and AV detection.  
 
1.1 Research Objectives 
 
Due to the emergence of smartphone-based business and banking transactions, there are 
significant threats present in the mobile networking environment. In this thesis, a 
systematic approach has been adopted to understand the nature of the threat of mobile 
banking malware especially for Android devices. A Framework for Systematic Analysis of 
Mobile Banking Malware(FAM)has been adopted in responding to critical research 
questions: 
 What are the major Android banking malware families and what are their properties? 
 How is Android banking malware distributed to its victims? 
 What common features do different Android banking malware families have?  
 Where do Android banking malware originate from?  
 Does Android malware utilise anti-forensic techniques to avoid being detected or analysed?  
 
In this thesis, we focus on analysing malware samples, detecting of malware is beyond the 
scope of this thesis but will be looked at for future work. 
 
1.2 Android banking malware  
 
Android banking malware are a subcategory of mobile banking malware. The relationship 
can be understood with a hierarchy structure: 
 
 (ABM) 
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In analysing ABM, it is logical to adopt and evaluate methodologies by parent and higher 
levels malware types. It is imperative to understand the banking malware profit model e.g. 
how cybercriminals make money from malware, so similar models could be studied for ABM. 
To study attack models, Android malware attack vectors and common Windows-based 
malware analysis methods (dynamic vs. static) need to be studied in a secure analysis 
environment.  
 
1.3 Behaviour Analysis of Android Banking Malware   
 
To conduct behaviour analysis, there is a need to scan the collected mobile malware 
samples with a view to understanding the time of each sample was first seen, Anti-Virus 
engine detection rate and the timeline of each malware family. Then manual execution of 
malware in a lab environment should be adopted to examine the behaviour. Behaviour 
analysis can be automated using existing tools available, but without proper interaction with 
malware the results from automatic behaviour analysis are not as granular as those from 
the manual analysis. This analysis should aid in understanding malware families, AV 
malware 
Banking 
malware  
Mobile Banking 
Malware 
Android 
Banking 
Malware (ABM) 
iOS Banking 
malware 
Other mobile 
OS Banking 
malware  
PC Banking 
malware 
Other malware e.g Ransomware, 
adware, spyware etc 
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detection and distribution methods. In this thesis, 37 Android banking malware samples 
were categorised into 8 different malware families. 
 
1.4 Static analysis of samples 
 
Static analysis requires analysis of important files to explain the main functions of 
different Android banking malware families. Here, in-depth understanding of functions and 
techniques used by the malware developer are studied. Static and behavioural analyses are 
complementary. In this study, it was observed that new techniques have been adopted by 
Android malware over the years; this observation was possible with the help of static 
analysis. Particularly, there have been significant improvements in coding techniques, 
obfuscation, encryption and anti-SDK etc.  
 
1.5 Framework for Systematic Analysis of Mobile 
Banking Malware (FAM) 
 
This work proposes FAM, the Framework for Systematic Analysis of Mobile Banking 
Malware. FAM aims to be a systematic strategy to analyse ABMs in the quickest possible 
way, so harm caused by new types of malware could be minimised and their behaviour 
could be understood, so mitigating techniques could be employed. FAM presents a 
methodology, which has been adopted to conduct studies in this thesis. Following are the 
steps of the framework:  
1) Identification of common attack vectors of Android banking malware, 
2) Android malware feature analysis  
3) Systematic dynamic and static analysis of the malware sample binaries 
4) Life cycle analysis of Android banking malware: distribution, infection and AV 
detection 
5) Anti-forensic techniques adopted by the Android banking malware  
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1.6 Thesis Contribution 
 
This thesis will address following research questions by adopting the above proposed 
Framework for systematic Analysis of Android Banking Malware (FAM): 
 What are the major Android banking malware families and how are they distributed? 
 What common features do different Android banking malware families have?  
 What techniques are used in recent Android banking malware to prevent them from 
being analysed? 
Android banking malware are posing new threats to financial institutions and consumers, 
and indications are that these threats will become more severe in the future. Therefore, 
there is need to study these emerging threats and develop strategies to analyse the 
behaviour of these malware for harm minimisation purposes. This thesis makes the 
following contributions: 
a) Extensive literature review - there is significant shortage of literature on mobile 
banking malware, so chapter 2 of the thesis presents literature in a very coordinated 
manner;   
b) Development of a generalised framework for systematic analysis of mobile banking 
malware; 
c) Collection of mobile banking malware samples and behavioural analysis of the 
samples; 
d) Static analysis of the collected malware samples; and 
e) Validation of proposed framework results and life-cycle analysis of mobile malware 
banking samples. 
These contributions have been made in chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
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This thesis makes contribution in presenting investigative studies conducted on samples of 
mobile banking malware. Thesis presents studies in very coherent ways. Following is the 
outline of the remaining thesis: 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review, covering banking malware, banking malware families, 
Android malware, static and dynamic analysis of malware, and testing lab setup. 
Chapter 3 presents studies on Android Banking Malware Family Behaviour and Distribution. 
This chapter also highlights the details of the datasets captured and used in the studies. 
Anti-virus studies done on the samples are also presented. Finally, Android banking malware 
family and distribution details are presented. 
Chapter 4 presents Android Banking Malware Static Analysis and Evolution in Techniques 
and introduces the tools used in conducting static analysis on the samples. Analysis of 
samples from the same malware family at different time period reveals the improvements 
and evolutions of techniques in malware coding. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings after analysis of the samples in terms of behavioural and 
static fashions. This chapter also makes detailed recommendation on the findings of the 
thesis. 
 
1.8 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented high level introduction of Android banking malware and has 
indicated that these malware are a subset of mobile malware, where mobile malware are 
subset of malware in general. The research objectives have been presented, as well as a 
framework to symmetrically analyse malware samples by conducting life-cycle analysis, 
behavioural analysis and static analysis. Thesis contributions and organisation have been 
presented.  
Chapter 2 presents a background and literature review supporting the research on life cycle 
and behavioural and static analysis, which are presented in chapter 3 and 4 respectively. 
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CHAPTER 2: Mobile Malware Behaviours 
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2.1 Banking malware 
 
Banking malware, sometimes referred as financial malware, is a category of malware 
which is developed to defraud customers of banks and financial institutions, making it 
possible to transfer funds from the victim’s account to the attacker's using electronic 
fund transfers(EFT).  
Banking malware can be generic or targeted. A generic banking malware is developed to 
steal user login credential from any Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) sessions, not only Internet banking web sites. A targeted banking malware has 
particular bank or financial institutions configured in their configuration files, and make 
use of the configuration file to trigger Man-In-The-Browser attack[8], which is a 
technique that takes advantage of vulnerabilities in browser security to modify 
webpages, modify transaction content or insert additional transactions, all in a 
completely covert fashion invisible to both the user and the host web application.[9] 
Historically, only sensitive information like online banking are protected by SSL, however, 
in recent years, SSL is used widely to protect any confidential information online. And 
the data volume in SSL sessions is becoming so big that it’s hard for the cybercriminals to 
extract useful data to perform fraud transactions against the banks.  This has made the 
generic banking malware less effective. Most attackers have now moved on to targeted 
banking malware. In this research, we refer banking malware as targeted banking 
malware. 
Banking malware is normally distributed via phishing email or drive-by downloads. 
Phishing email distribution is more targeted but has a lower infection rate, as malware 
can be detected and blocked by email server anti-virus (AV) program. Drive-by 
downloads may happen when a user visits a website or clicks on a deceptive pop-up 
window. Victims often click on the window by mistaken belief that, for instance, an error 
report from the computer's operating system itself is being acknowledged, or that an 
innocuous advertisement pop-up is being dismissed. In such cases, the "supplier" may 
claim that the user "consented" to the download, although actually the user was 
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unaware of having started an unwanted or malicious software download[10]. Drive-by 
downloads are more generic in nature and attackers always use different techniques to 
obfuscate the malicious code so that AV software is unable to recognize it. In recent 
time, this has become a popular way to distribute banking malware. 
After banking malware is distributed and executed on the victim’s PC, it normally stays 
in the background unobtrusively until the victim visits an online banking site in the 
browser. Most banking malware have an ability to intercept submitted credentials by 
logging the user's keystrokes, which are then sent to cybercriminals who defraud the 
bank later using these stolen credentials. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
published a fraud scheme in October 2010, which described how cybercriminals commit 
fraud using one of the infamous malware - Zeus (figure below). Zeus, also refered as 
ZeuS, or Zbot is a Trojan horse malware package that runs on versions of Microsoft 
Windows. While it can be used to carry out many malicious and criminal tasks, it is often 
used to steal banking information by man-in-the-browser keystroke logging and form 
grabbing.  Although Zeus is not Android malware, it was heavily used in Android 
malware distribution.  Below figure shows very clearly that banking malware is playing a 
critical role in cyber theft ring.  
 
 
Figure 1 – How fraud Works - FBI
[11]
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To mitigate fraud risks from credential stealing malware, many banks employ virtual 
keyboard. Virtual keyboard is a software technology that displays an on-screen keyboard, 
requiring the user to use their mouse to click virtual keys to enter sensitive details such 
as password. The corresponding key will be typed into the selected textbox on the 
screen. In this case, the use of traditional keyboard is nullified so that banking malware 
could not intercept anything from monitoring keyboard events. Thus sensitive and 
personal information can be protected. However, cybercriminals improved banking 
malware to defeat this control as well. Advanced banking malware were developed to 
take screenshots on the mouse click event, all screenshots are then uploaded to the 
malware control and command server which is managed by the cybercriminal. Even 
worse, some more advanced banking malware can even record video of user’s online 
banking session, and upload video files to cybercriminals’ servers. 
Besides credential stealing, cybercriminals have also worked on malware “automation”, 
some complex malware even have the ability to manipulate bank customer initiated 
payment details, automate EFT in the background, or add additional fraud EFT when the 
victim makes genuine transactions. 
 
2.2 Banking malware families 
 
Malware are generally grouped at two hierarchical levels: “variant” and “family”; where 
“variant” refers to a different version of the original malicious code, and “family” 
indicates the distinct or original piece of malware.[12] 
A few very large malware families are responsible for the majority of Internet banking 
related fraud through malware, due to their advanced functionalities. The most notable 
of these malware families are Zeus, Citadel, SpyEye and Carberp.[13] 
Zeus malware, also referred as Zbot, is one of the original banking malware. It was first 
identified in 2007 and became more wide spread in 2009. This infamous banking 
malware is normally spread through drive-by downloads and phishing campaigns. It 
mainly steals online banking credentials by Man-In-The-Browser keystroke logging and 
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form grabbing. Functionally, malware in the Zeus family has two main components: a 
builder that can generate a bot executable and a Control and Command (C&C) server to 
monitor and control the malware. Zeus source code was leaked in May 2011, which 
allowed other malware developers to study and create malware based on its code. New 
malware families like Ice IX, Citadel, Gameover Zeus, P2P Zeus are all different variations 
based on Zeus source code. Citadel was one of the most successful successors of Zeus[14]. 
Besides newer and more dynamic features of the malware, the creators of Citadel 
adopted an open-source development model that let anyone review its code and 
improve upon it. In June 2013, Microsoft, along with law enforcement agencies and 
other security companies, conducted an operation that helped to disrupt many Citadel-
based botnets. Microsoft then claimed that 88% of the botnets spawned by Citadel 
malware had been taken down[15].  SpyEye was designed by a rival group to compete 
with Zeus in 2010. Function-wise, it was similar to Zeus in a lot of ways. To compete with 
Zeus, the latest SpyEye versions contained an interesting feature called “Kill Zeus”, 
which could take over an infected PC when it’s infected by both Zeus and SpyEye. 
Although SpyEye had some success in its early days, the run almost ended after a series 
of cybercriminal arrests in 2012[16]. Like Zeus, Carberp has the ability to steal sensitive 
data from infected machines and download new data from command-and-control 
servers. It has complex rootkit functionalities allowing the malware to remain 
undetected by antivirus on the victim’s system. Carberp source code was leaked to the 
public in June 2013, and security researchers soon discovered a new malware called 
Zerp with combined features of both Zeus and Carberp[17]. 
These major banking malware families have been heavily analyzed by researchers from 
different angles.  Some researchers focused on malware functionality[1819], and 
configuration[2021], and others focus on the techniques that malware employs to deter 
analysis e.g code obfuscation[22], or malware detection[23].  Malware source code leaks 
and extensive analysis of these malware have led to an enhanced understanding how 
many of these malware work. 
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2.3 Android malware 
 
Due to the popularity of Android OS, it has rapidly become a significant target for 
malware attacks.  
In, August 2010, the first known SMS malware for Android was discovered and reported 
by Dennis Mashlennikov from Kaspersky Lab. This malware disguises itself as a movie 
player and sends SMS to two premium rate numbers without the owner’s knowledge. 
The cost of each message is $5, resulting in big bills to owners from premium messaging 
providers. The malware only targeted Russian users and it was not found on Android 
Market (which was renamed to Google Play in 2012)[24]. 
In the same month as the discovery of first SMS malware for Android, Symantec 
discovered a GPS spyware which had the ability to collect and send GPS coordinates to a 
remote server every 15 minutes without the mobile phone owner’s knowledge[25]. 
Because the malware was not found in Android Market and not widespread, the impact 
was minimal at that time. 
At the end of 2010, mobile security company Lookout announced their discovery of 
Android malware Geinimi, which was the most sophisticated malware for Android found 
in the wild[26]. Geinimi is an example of repackaging a legitimate application with 
malicious code, and demonstrated the possibility of “Trojanization” in the Android world. 
More “Trojanized” versions of legitimate apps were discovered and reported in 2011. 
Given they were all hosted in unofficial app stores and app download sites, the golden 
rule for Android users was to only download and install apps from official app store – 
Android Market. However, this recommendation became less effective when Lookout 
discovered more than 50 apps containing DroidDream malware in the official Android 
Market[27]. 
In May 2011, a new malware named DroidKungFu was discovered in the official Android 
Market by researchers at North Carolina State University[28]. DroidKungFu was a 
successor of DroidDream and carried out the same malicious activities: stealing device 
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information and installing an Android malware downloader app. Unlike DroidDream, 
DroidKungFu encrypts the exploits using AES to evade AV detection[29].  
Years 2010 and 2011 were the beginning of Android malware epidemic, which can be 
clearly verified by security industry statistics. According to Juniper Networks, in 2010 
Android malware only comprised 0.5% of total mobile malware. One year later, this 
number became 46.7%[30]; by the end of 2011, Android malware increased to 47% of 
total mobile malware threat, and this number doubled over 2012, reaching 92% in 
March 2013[31]. Kaspersky Lab reported in February 2014 that 98.05% of all malware 
detected in 2013 targeted Android platform[32]. 
The rampant growth of Android malware has led to research from both academia and 
industry. Some researchers focused on collecting Android samples, systematically 
analysing and characterising the data set, in order to gain better understanding of 
Android malware attack vectors and infection behaviours from different malware 
families[33]. There are a few tools and systems created by researchers to assist Android 
malware analysis. DroidScope is an example[34], developed as a platform that continues 
the tradition of virtualization-based malware analysis. 
Android malware detection and prevention has also been heavily researched, based on 
malware behaviour or code patterns; a few tools have been developed to assist 
assessing Android applications and detecting malicious or risky apps. For example, 
RiskRanker is developed as an automated system to analyse whether a particular app 
exhibits dangerous behaviour (e.g., launching a root exploit or sending background SMS 
messages)[35]. 
 
2.4 Android Banking malware 
 
Mobile banking is undergoing tremendous growth as customers increasingly choose 
smart devices over bank tellers, which has resulted in banks closing branches and 
investing in online services. Many banks also believe that mobile devices are a secure 
secondary method of out-of-band authentication. To authenticate the people who have 
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phones, many banks built their second factor authentication solutions on short message 
services (SMS), which is one of the most widely available protocols, but this protocol has 
its own security flaws. With the perception of extra layer authentication control, bank 
customers are allowed to carry out riskier transactions. This makes it more attractive to 
cybercriminals, because they can potentially steal more money if this authentication 
layer is circumvented. 
On September 25th, 2010, a Spanish-based data security company S21sec detected a 
malware which targets Symbian and BlackBerry OS. The malware was working in 
conjunction with Zeus malware; and developed to forward Mobile Transaction 
Authentication Number (mTAN) to the attackers. S21sec published this threat on their 
blog.[36] This became the first Zeus in the Mobile (ZitMo) malware detected.  
On 21 February 2011, the second ZitMo attack analysis was published by a Polish 
blogger, the malware was developed clearly targeting specific organizations: ING and 
mBank.[37] 
Various modifications of ZitMo have been detected since then; and other PC-based 
malware also started to incorporate the same technique to develop their mobile 
versions. A number of mobile variants of PC-based malware have been seen e.g. SpyEye 
in the Mobile (SPitMo) in 2011[38], and Carberp in the Mobile (CitMo) in 2012. [39]  
Although initially mobile banking malware targeted Symbian and BlackBerry OS, but with 
the increasing popularity of Android OS and significant growth of malware on this 
platform, Android OS has become the primary target by Mobile banking malware in 
recent years.   
Although a lot of research has been done to counter Android malware, but there is very 
little research focusing on a particular subset – Android banking malware. This might be 
because the volume of Android banking malware was low and there were not enough 
samples for researchers to do the study. However, this has changed in recent two years. 
In 2013, there was a dramatic increase in the number of Android banking malware. 
Kaspersky Lab quoted this increase as “Trend of the year”, because they only had 67 
Android banking malware in January 2013, but collected 1321 unique samples by the 
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end of the year[40]. Furthermore, Kaspersky Lab reported that in the first quarter of 2014, 
the number of mobile banking malware almost doubled from 1321 to 2503. These 
malware started initially targeting users from Russian and Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), and then it was found that these malware have been affecting 
users in other countries: Germany, Sweden, France, Italy, the UK and the US[41]. 
Kaspersky also reported that 98.5% mobile malware that were collected by Kaspersky 
Lab were targeting Android OS, which indicated that almost all of mobile banking 
malware they reported were Android banking malware.  
Despite dramatic growth, the total number of Android banking malware is still relatively 
small. There is no existing Android banking malware sample dataset that are publically 
available to the research community. In this research, we managed to collect samples 
from different sources including Internet, other security researchers and financial 
institutions in Australia and internationally, we believe that our malware sample dataset 
is a good representation of past and current Android banking malware.  
Like Windows-based malware, Android malware can also be categorized into different 
malware families. Some family names are based on the PC malware name that they 
work together with, for example ZitMo means Zeus in the Mobile; Some family names 
are based on the malware author’s name, e.g Perkele; There are also some malware 
with generic family names, e.g SmsSpy. We have detailed analysis on Android banking 
families in Chapter 3.  
 
2.5 Static (Code) VS. Dynamic (Behaviour) Analysis 
Malware 
 
There are two types of malware analysis – Static and Dynamic. Both static and dynamic 
analyses accomplish the same goal of explaining how malware works, but from different 
perspectives.  
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Static analysis, also referred as code analysis, is widely used by antivirus industries. It is 
based on malicious binary inspection, looking for malicious functions in malware source 
code. On the other hand, dynamic or behaviour analysis involves executing the sample in a 
controlled and sanitized environment to record and analyse its behaviour using pre-installed 
tools in order to understanding malware execution traces.  
Static analysis can reveal all malicious functions used by the malware. However, it is time 
consuming due to the fact that techniques like code obfuscation can really slow static 
analysis down. Cybercriminals may deliberately obfuscate code to conceal malware purpose 
or its logic, in order to deter reverse engineering. Code obfuscation is commonly employed 
by Windows malware and is expected in Android malware. The Android SDK includes a tool 
named Proguard[42] for obfuscating Apps. Furthermore, bytecode randomization techniques 
can be used to completely hide the internal logic of a Dalvic bytcode program[43].  
Dynamic analysis is considered relatively faster and immune to code obfuscation. With the 
malware being executed, analyst is able to see the malicious behaviour on an actual 
execution path. The downside of dynamic analysis is that it only exploits one execution path, 
and it may not be effective if user interaction is needed to trigger the malicious activity. 
Although it can be ameliorated by exploiting multiple execution paths or a user action can 
be configured to trigger malware activity, but additional understanding of the malware will 
be required prior to the analysis.  
In this research, both static and dynamic analyses were performed to gain a complete 
understanding on how that particular malware functions.  Analysis of malware distribution 
method was also performed.  
 
2.6 Malware Lab Setup  
 
Setting up of a controlled and sanitized environment is absolutely essential for analysing 
malware, regardless the Operating System. 
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The research computer had Windows 7 installed with the following specifications: Intel(R) 
Xeon(R) CPU E5620 @ 2.40 GHz 2.39 GHz (2 processors), 4 GB RAM DDR3 and 100 GB hard 
disk. 
On the research PC, we installed virtual machine VMware Workstation version 9.03 build-
1410761. Inside the virtual machine we have a few virtual machines installed:  
MobiSec OS is installed for Android malware analysis. MobiSec is a bootable Linux 
distribution designed for mobile devices, applications and infrastructure analysis. MobiSec is 
a single environment with several excellent open source mobile malware analysis tools pre-
installed and configured. Tools like dex2jar, apktools, JD-GUI, DroidBox are all used later in 
the research. Android emulators are also available in the live environment. MobiSec is 
maintained as an open source project on Source Forge[44]. 
During the research, it has been discovered that many Android banking malware are 
associated closely with traditional Windows based malware. Therefore we installed REMnux 
version4 to assist with Windows malware analysis. REMnux is a lightweight Linux 
distribution to assist malware analysts with reverse-engineering malicious software on 
Windows OS. The distribution is based on Ubuntu and is maintained by Lenny Zeltser[45].Two 
Windows virtual machine: Windows 7 and Windows XP (SP2) were installed for Windows 
malware analysis. 
Android SDK [46] - A Software Development Kit that allows users to create and test Android 
applications - was installed on the host research PC. An Android Virtual Device can be 
created using the Android Virtual Device Manager within Android SDK. 
In case malware can detect virtualized environment or emulator, a native Android test 
device - Samsung Galaxy S2 was also employed. This test device specs are: Model number: 
GT-I9100; Android version: 4.1.2(Jelly Bean); Baseband version: I9100XXLS9; Kernel version: 
3.0.31-889555, dpi@Dell144 #3, SMP PREEMPT Tue Feb 10 11:18:12, KST 2013; Build 
number: JZO54K.I9100XWLSH. The test device was connected to the same network as the 
host research computer, and has several tools (e.g traffic analysis tool: SharkForRoot) 
installed for malware analysis. Figure 2 shows how the test lab was set up. 
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Figure 2 - Lab Environment 
 
2.7  Chapter Conclusions 
 
Malware analysis is very time-consuming and tedious work, so there is need to understand 
existing standalone malware analysis techniques in PC environment and formulate a 
comprehensive malware analysis framework for banking Android malware. This thesis work 
has collected significant samples of Android banking malware, and then has conducted 
experiments to complete the analysis using the proposed framework. Application of the 
framework is dependent on the nature of the malware sample. The following chapters 
present studies done on various aspects of the framework. 
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CHAPTER 3: Android Banking Malware Family 
Behaviour and Distribution 
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3.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we first present an overview of the collected samples created using the 
VirusTotal[47] online tool. VirusTotal uses up to 54 different antivirus products and scan 
engines to check for viruses, which provides us more detailed information about the 
samples. Secondly, we dynamically analyse all collected malware samples manually. Manual 
dynamic analysis involves installing the malware in a controlled and sanitized environment, 
and observing malware presentation, behaviour and network communication using various 
tools.  Both an Android emulator and a native test Android device were used for manual 
dynamic analysis, in case any malware has the ability to detect a virtual or emulated 
environment. When possible, screenshots from analysis were captured and are presented to 
demonstrate the “look and feel” of each malware family. We also researched and analysed 
how Android banking malware were distributed. Malware distribution methods will help us 
understand the full life cycle of each attack. For each malware family, we collected 
information about where the samples were originally gathered using primary and secondary 
sources, and summarized each Android banking malware families history and attack lifecycle. 
Thirdly, we present the results of automated analysis using Droidbox, an Android malware 
sandbox tool, against all the samples in the data set. From the automated analysis reports 
we found some similarities and commonalities between Android banking malware 
behaviours, which could assist with Android banking malware identification and detection in 
the future. 
Although some of the samples were a few years old and previously studied and analysed by 
researchers and industry malware analysts, our research aimed to cluster them based on 
presentation, distribution technique, and attack flow and explore differences and 
similarities between malware software. In addition, by dynamically analysing all samples in a 
consistent environment, we verify previous analysis.  
 
3.2 Dataset 
 
Page | 32  
 
The dataset comprises 37 samples that were collected from publicly-available such as 
GitHub and private sources such as security industry forums etc.. Based on source code 
structure and development group, malware samples in the dataset has been categorized in 
to 8 different malware families: Citmo, Fakebank, iBanking, Perkele, smsSpy, Spitmo , 
Svpeng and Zitmo. 
 
 
Table 1 – Malware Family and Number of Variants 
 
Virus Total was employed to scan the collected mobile malware samples to gain an 
understanding about the time of each sample was first seen, Anti-Virus engine detection 
rates and the timeline of each malware family. Different antivirus engines normally assign 
different names to the same malware sample; we also used this information to validate the 
family that a sample belongs to. The "first-seen" date is taken to mean the date when the 
malware was first uploaded to VirusTotal for analysis. Although it is not the date of malware 
release, it is a good indication of when malware was discovered. 
 
3.3 AV Detection and Malware Family  
 
From the VirusTotal scan, we recorded the malware MD5, first-seen dates and detection 
rates from various antivirus engines, which are presented in Table 2 below. The MD5 
algorithm is a widely used hash function producing a 128-bit hash value, It has be used as a 
Family No. of Variant Appearance time period
Citmo 3 Dec-12
Fakebank 8 Aug 2013-Apr 2014
iBanking 7 Nov 2013-2014
Perkele 4 Mar 2013 - Mar 2014
SmsSpy 4 Mar 2013 - Dec 2013
Spitmo 1 Aug-11
Svpeng 1 Sep 2013 - 2014
Zitmo 9 Feb 2011 - Apr 2013
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checksum to verify data integrity. MD5 has been used by anti-virus company as virus 
identifier for a long time, it has been the fastest and shortest generated hash, although it 
was found vulnerable to collision attack[48], it doesn’t impact this research.  The VirusTotal 
scan results suggest a timeline for the emergence of each malware family. We can see that 
most *itMo(Zitmo, Spitmo, Citmo) malware were seen from 2010 to 2012, followed by 
Perkele, smsSpy,  FakeBank, Svpeng in 2013, and most iBanking in 2014.  
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Table 2 - AV Detection 
 
Although some of these samples were originally detected several years ago, the AV 
detection rates were only at an average of 64.36%. We also observed that older 
Family MD5 First seen AV Detection Detection ratio
07d2ee88083f41482a859cd222ec7b76 13/12/2012 38/54 70.37%
117d41e18cb3813e48db8289a40e5350 15/12/2012 38/54 70.37%
f27d43dfeedffac2ec7e4a069b3c9516 13/12/2012 38/54 70.37%
37dff309cc911a1dc16cce4e51f9827b 16/08/2013 33/54 61.11%
67e7bb573eaa1f25772809a471cda327 16/08/2013 33/54 61.11%
7276e76298c50d2ee78271cf5114a176 14/11/2013 29/54 53.70%
8bf10991f292ec7d165086506e8f0eda 22/09/2013 35/54 64.81%
98eea1d94a479e022e46d69b0fbe2453 5/11/2013 32/53 60.38%
a0721023ec39948251818306a15d3268 22/09/2013 35/54 64.81%
a15b704743f53d3edb9cdd1182ca78d1 3/04/2014 30/54 55.56%
aac4d15741abe0ee9b4afe78be090599 13/02/2014 28/54 51.85%
009e60205b8fbc780a2dd3083cdd61cb 4/02/2014 33/54 61.11%
1f68addf38f63fe821b237bc7baabb3d 17/12/2013 34/54 62.96%
d1059b52b6127b758581eb86247bc34f 4/02/2014 34/54 62.96%
df1c6dfb6830ba845231af26d80354de 5/04/2014 31/54 57.41%
e1b86054468d6ac1274188c0c579ccaf 19/11/2013 35/54 64.81%
f06af629d33f17938849f822930ae428 29/12/2013 34/53 64.15%
f1bc8520754d2ac4a920b3ef5c732380 26/02/2014 33/53 62.26%
22d67d86493e9f16e7e5a8cd87ca177c 8/03/2013 31/54 57.41%
4efa9b64dd3171bc584becc8c5e3bebb 19/04/2013 26/54 48.15%
9f42936cdc6fb3a4cf146c85b376f85a 7/03/2014 28/51 54.90%
b597850b04140e0e28749e0a11cc0118 5/05/2013 32/54 59.26%
98951168215955a1f14198b19a134b14 6/05/2013 28/51 54.90%
74e09c5f57d5a040c86a86cdad7f04fa 3/05/2013 33/52 63.46%
b226a66a2796e922302b96ae81540d5c 12/03/2013 40/54 74.07%
e29cec3924426dda960633fe56e0b86a 12/12/2013 27/55 49.09%
Spitmo cfa9edb8c9648ae2757a85e6066f6515 10/08/2011 44/53 83.02%
Svpeng a3eb6b30e23146d9d44103addc71a41b 15/09/2013 34/54 62.96%
1cf41bdc0fdd409774eb755031a6f49d 19/04/2013 34/54 62.96%
2dfccca5a9cdf207fb43a54b2194e368 19/06/2012 39/54 72.22%
6ddaae38a49cefcb1445871e0955bef3 19/06/2012 39/54 72.22%
a1593777ac80b828d2d520d24809829d 4/04/2012 39/53 73.58%
b1ae0d9a2792193bff8c129c80180ab0 13/06/2012 42/54 77.78%
d1cf8ab0987a16c80cea4fc29aa64b56 19/06/2012 41/54 75.93%
e9068f116991b2ee7dcd6f2a4ecdd141 19/06/2012 39/54 72.22%
e98791dffcc0a8579ae875149e3c8e5e 8/08/2012 36/53 67.92%
ecbbce17053d6eaf9bf9cb7c71d0af8d 2/06/2011 42/53 79.25%
Citmo
Fakebank
iBanking
Perkele
Zitmo
SmsSpy
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malware samples have better detection rates (Table 3). However, this detection rate 
might be low as not all antivirus engines used by VirusTotal were able to detect mobile 
malware[49].  
 
 
Table 3 – AV Detection Rate by year 
 
3.3 Android Banking Malware Family and 
Distribution  
3  
In order to understand malware behaviour, each malware sample was manually installed 
and executed in a sandboxed environment or isolated native Android device in cases where 
the malware could detect the virtual environment. We then observed the appearance and 
behaviour of the malware. The distribution method of each malware family was 
investigated and compared in order to understand the whole malware attack flow. 
Banking malware that target Windows OS are normally distributed via phishing emails and 
drive-by downloads. This distribution is non-targeted but effective, because these malware 
are normally configured to target multiple banks and financial institutions. When the 
infected user logs in to their online banking, if the online banking URL matches the URL 
wildcard in malware configuration file – which is basically the malware’s target list, the 
malware injects itself into browser processes to hook selected APIs, and then steal user’s 
credentials or manipulate user’s online banking session. 
Banking malware that target Android OS, on the other hand, are more targeted. Most 
samples in the dataset works in tandem with the traditional Windows desktop malware, 
aiming to steal the second factor passed via mobile phone, which could be later used to 
Year of samples Detection rate Average detection rate
2011 81.13%
2012 72.30%
2013 60.56%
2014 58.01%
64.36%
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complete fraudulent transactions together with the login username and password that were 
captured in Windows.  
3.3.1 Zitmo, Spitmo, and Citmo 
 
We put Zitmo, Spitmo and Citmo together to analyse because they share the same 
“surname” - *itmo. The name of the malware families indicated the Windows malware 
families they are working in tandem with – Zeus, Spyeye, Carberp.   
On a high level, Android malware Zitmo, Spitmo and Citmo are served as malicious payloads 
by their Windows “brothers” -  Zeus, Spyeye and Carberp. While these windows malware 
can steal Online Banking login credentials, Zitmo, Spitmo and Citmo play the part to 
compromise the mobile component in order to complete an unauthorized transaction. 
Technically, Zitmo, Spitmo and Citmo malware are distributed via Windows malware’s 
webinjects[50] in online banking sessions; when a user on an infected PC authenticates to an 
online banking session using SMS authentication, the Windows malware injects malicious 
code components that can modify the bank web pages which are being displayed in the 
victim’s browser.   
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Figure 3 - Zitmo Distribution
[51]
 
 
Figure 3 is an example of how the Zeus malware distributed Zitmo: a webinject from Zeus 
requires the installation of new “security update” to user’s mobile device, the user is asked 
to provide mobile phone model and number in order to receive and install the new “security 
update”. After providing mobile phone information, the user will receive an SMS with a link 
to click and download the “security update” to his/her mobile device, alternatively, a link is 
injected to the online banking session and displayed on the screen for the user to type in 
his/her mobile phone.  After installation, the user sees a new icon on the dashboard. Once 
the app is started, a “security code” will be generated. Figure 4 below shows two examples 
of Zitmo app after installation, and the look when it’s started.  
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Figure 4 - Zitmo installation: From left to right: after sample 1 installed, when sample 1 was executed, after 
sample 2 installed, when sample2 was executed 
 
The distribution method of Spitmo is very similar to Zitmo, however after installation, 
there’s no new item added to the dashboard. Under application management function, we 
found a new application called “System”, which did not exist before the malware installation. 
This app has permission to receive, read, edit, send messages, access Internet, as well as 
intercept outgoing phone calls (See Figure 5 below).  
 
 
Figure 5 - Spitmo: From left to right: “system” application is showing under application management on 
infected device, permissions of this “system” application 
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Citmo utilize webinjects from Carberp malware, and is distributed to potential victims in the 
same way as Zitmo and Spitmo. Some Citmo variants even employ Quick Response (QR) 
code for distribution. QR code is normally injected to the webpage by Carberp malware so 
that the mobile user can scan the code to download and install the Citmo malware. This 
distribution technique not only made the malware installation easier, but also potentially 
reduces the risk of being suspected by the potential victim – people tend to be more careful 
when they key in a URL than scan a QR code[52]. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Citmo distribute by QR code
[53]
 
 
A bank-themed icon will be added after Citmo malware installation. When started, the user 
will be asked to enter his/her phone number to get verified. Below screenshots are from 2 
different samples: 
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Figure 7 - Citmo verify phone number: From left to right: sample 1 verifying phone number, sample 2 
verifying phone number 
 
It is worthwhile to point out that, these three Citmo samples in the dataset were uploaded 
to Google play (Russia) on 30th November 2012. Google removed them quickly, however, 
these three malware applications were downloaded over 150 times.  
Although the Citmo samples in the dataset only target Russian banks, after the July 2013 
leak of Carberp source code[54], anyone can modify Carberp, it’s possible to see new Citmo 
variants targeting users in other countries. 
Some *itmo variants also target other mobile operating systems such as BlackBerry[55]; 
however investigating these variants is not in scope of this research. 
3.3.2 Perkele 
The release of the *itmo malware was later followed by the next Android banking malware 
family – Perkele. In March 2013, the Perkele malware was uncovered by Brain Krebs on 
underground Russian-language forums[56]. “Perkele” is a Finnish curse word for “devil” or 
“damn”, and was used as nickname by the malware coder. This Android malware is 
designed to work in tandem with Windows malware webinjects. Unlike its *itmo 
predecessors, Perkele is able to work with any Windows banking malware family that 
supports webinjects –it can essentially be loaded as an add-on by the malware. When the 
victim attempts to log in to their bank account using their infected PC, malware webinject 
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informs the victim that in order to complete the second, mobile authentication portion of 
the login process, the user will need to install a special security certificate on their phone. 
The victim is then prompted to enter their mobile device’s model, OS and number 
information. A link is sent to the mobile device which, when clicked on, installs Perkele on 
the device. During installation, the malware requests the permissions to read and send SMS 
messages. When started, the Perkele malware asks for a password and password 
confirmation. After providing and confirming the password, a “certificate” and a number is 
showed on the screen. See Figure 7 below. 
 
 
Figure 8 - Perkele installation: From left to right: permissions required for installation, after malware 
execution 
 
We also monitored incoming and outgoing network traffic from the infected device under 
dynamic analysis. It is observed that once the mobile “security” app was installed, it 
communicated to a few external IPs immediately. Below is a screenshot of traffic over HTTP: 
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Figure 9 – Perkele Network traffic shows the communication to external IPs immediately after installation  
 
3.3.3 smsSpy - Pincer 
 
Pincer was one of the main variant from smsSpy family. It was first uncovered by a Finnish 
security firm F-Secure in April 2013. It comes disguised as a security certificate and, 
according to F-Secure notes, is designed to surreptitiously intercept and forward text 
messages[57]. In our dataset, malware with MD5:98951168215955a1f14198b19a134b14 is a 
Pincer sample. Below is a screenshot of Pincer being started after installation: 
 
 
Figure 10 – Pincer 
 
Pincer has not been found on Google Play and was not heavily distributed. It appears to be 
meant for precise attacks, as opposed to being aimed at as many users as possible[58].  
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3.3.4 smsSpy - Marcher 
 
Marcher was the other main variant from smsSpy family. The sample with MD5: 
e29cec3924426dda960633fe56e0b86a in our dataset is a Marcher sample. AVG ThreatLabs 
described this malware as a malicious Android app used to interrupt the normal operations 
of an Android device and gain access to private information stored in it. One example of 
malicious behaviour is to disguise as legitimate banking applications and steal bank 
credentials when the user logs in. Below are some screenshots that were taken when this 
sample was installed and run. Upon installation, the app requires the permission to receive 
and send SMS, and also requests the permission to read phone status and make phone calls 
directly. It is branded as “SMSAES” and has a function to generate code and close the 
application. 
 
 
Figure 11 – Marcher: From left to right: application permissions when install, loading page when executed, 
after application loaded, after tap “Generate” button. 
 
The major malicious function of this group of malware is spying on SMS, as indicated by its 
generic name. The distribution method varies from Instant Messaging over mobile phone to 
phishing email. 
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3.3.5 Fakebank 
 
The next malware family in our dataset was Fakebank. Fakebank malware was first 
uncovered in mid-2013, and appears to target online banking users from South Korea. 
According to Symantec’s research, this FakeBank Android malware was distributed by a 
Windows malware called Trojan.Droidpak[59]. When infected, it drops a DLL file on the 
Windows PC and ensures its persistence across reboots by registering a new system service. 
It then downloads a configuration file from a remote server that contains the malicious APK 
(Android application package) file called AV-cdk.apk. The Windows malware downloads the 
malicious APK, as well as the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) command line tool that allows 
users to execute commands on Android devices connected to a PC. ADB is part of the official 
Android Software Development Kit (SDK). The malware executes the “adb.exe install AV-
cdk.apk” command repeatedly to ensure that if an Android device is connected to the host 
computer at any time, the malicious APK is silently installed on it. However, this approach 
has a limitation—it will work only if “USB debugging” is enabled on the Android device. 
USB debugging setting is normally used by Android developers, but it’s also required for 
some operations that are not directly related to development, like gaining root/privilege 
user access to the OS, taking screen captures on devices running old Android versions or 
installing custom Android firmware. Even if this feature is rarely used, users who turn it on 
once to perform a particular task may forget to disable it when they don’t need it 
anymore.[60] 
When the user installs this malware, it creates an icon like Google Play and calls itself 
Google App Store. After installation, the malware looks for certain Korean online banking 
applications on the compromised device and, if found, prompts users to delete them and 
install malicious versions. When users starts the disguised smart banking apps it asks them 
to fill in their account information, and submits the information to a malicious server.  
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Figure 12 – FakeBank targets Korean Bank. From left to right: fake Google App Store application permissions 
when installed; genuine Korean banking application on the device, fake banking application permission 
when install, fake banking application when execute 
 
Fakebank Android malware variants have been seen targeting some European banks too. 
Below are some screenshots of permission requests upon installation (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13 - Fakebank targets European banks. From left to right: Fakebank sample 1 permissions when 
installing, sample 1 executed, Fakebank sample 2 permissions when installing, sample 2 executed 
 
3.3.6 Sypeng 
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We have only one sample for the Svpeng malware family, because it is still relatively new 
and few samples are available for research. Svpeng malware was first uncovered and 
reported by Kaspersky Lab in 2013. It disguises itself as an Adobe Flash Player update, and 
spread via spam emails. Like other Android banking malware, upon installation, the sample 
requires permission to access personal information and networks; receive, read and send 
SMS; and read and make phone calls. In addition, Svpeng also requires permissions for 
storage access (modify or delete the contents of USB storage), hardware controls (record 
audio), development tools (test access to protected storage) and System tools (e. g, change 
network connectivity, connect and disconnect from WiFi, disable screen lock , close other 
apps, run at start up).  
Once installed, the application displays an icon with a letter "F" on a red background. When 
started, the app requires activating the "device administrator" feature of the mobile device. 
The Android Device Administration API was introduced by Android 2.2, and provides mobile 
device administration features at system level[61]. With the device administrator privilege, 
an app can prompt the user to set a new password, lock the device immediately or wipe the 
device’s data without the user’s knowledge. Furthermore, the device administration API 
supports additional policies, in this case, “set storage encryption” is the policy supported. 
This policy was introduced in Android 3.0 and allows an application to specify that the 
storage area should be encrypted if the device supports it.  Device administrator privileges 
can be disabled from the device settings; however, this malware displays a lock screen and 
asks for a passcode in order to de-activate device administrator privileges. Without the right 
passcode, this privilege cannot be disabled.  
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Figure 14 - Svpeng activating device administrator. From left to right: Device administrator access required 
when install, password required when delete the application   
 
Besides the extensive permissions the Svpeng sample asks for installation, this sample in our 
dataset doesn’t seem to be very banking-related. Later versions of Svpeng have more 
malicious functions, which makes it more effective as banking malware. Kaspersky Lab 
reported a variant of Svpeng malware with the ability to carry out overlay attacks[62]. After 
infection, the attack starts as soon as the victim clicks on his or her banking app. Following a 
click on the app, Svpeng generates a window that looks like the banking app that was just 
launched, which is presented on top of the actual app. This fools the victim into thinking 
that he or she is interacting with the legitimate app, but is actually feeding credentials to the 
malware. This is not a typical HTML injection attack as we know them from the Windows 
world, but rather a dedicated phishing window displayed on top of the genuine app. Using a 
similar method, the malicious program also tries to steal information about the user’s credit 
cards. When the user launches Google Play, the malware displays a window requesting card 
info on top of the Google Play window. Below are some screenshots from Kaspersky Lab’s 
research: 
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Figure 15 – Svpeng malware overlay attacks bank & Google Play
[63]
: From left to right: fake page overlays on 
top of Russian bank app when opened, fake card page asking for credit card information overlays on top of 
Google Play store when opened 
 
In addition to the overlay attack, at the beginning of 2014, Kaspersky Lab uncovered a new 
modification of Svpeng with ransomware capabilities[64]. Just as PC ransomware attacks 
scare and force the victim into paying the attacker money to regain control or access to the 
infected device, infected users receive a message on the device, which claims to have been 
sent by the FBI, explaining that the infected device has been used to access some prohibited 
content. The malware then locks the mobile device unless the user pays $200 ransom. It 
also takes a photo using the front camera and displays on the ransom message window.  
The malware accepts MoneyPak vouchers for the ransom payments, and indicates where 
the vouchers can be purchased. Figure 16 shows some relevant screenshots from Kaspersky 
Lab's research. 
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Figure 16 – Svpeng Ransomware
[65]
 : From left to right: fake FBI violation notice, specify MoneyPak as the 
payment method for the fine , indicate where to buy MoneyPak vouchers 
 
According to Kaspersky Lab’s analysis, the ransomware function of Svpeng completely 
blocks the mobile device, and persists after rebooting.  
 
3.3.7 iBanking 
 
iBanking was the last malware family investigated. iBanking malware was uncovered by 
researchers at Symantec in 2013, and became available for purchase at a major Eastern 
European underground forum in September 2013, replete with a broad range of malicious 
functionalities. In February 2014, RSA reported the leak of iBanking mobile bot source code. 
The leaked files also included a bash script builder that can un-pack the existing iBanking 
APK file and re-pack it with different configurations. Such malware source code leaks are 
always a double-edged sword, it allowed security researchers and analysts to understand 
more about this malware family, it also provided fraudsters with the means to create their 
own unique mobile malware. 
Similar to other mobile banking malware, iBanking also uses social engineering tactics to 
lure victims into downloading and installing the malware on their Android devices. The 
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victim is usually already infected with a banking malware on their Windows computer. 
When they visit a banking or social networking website, the Windows malware will generate 
a pop up message or inject malicious content in the web session, asking the victim to install 
a mobile app as an additional security measure. 
The user is prompted for their phone number, and the device will then be sent a download 
link for the fake software by SMS. If the user fails to receive the message for any reason, the 
attackers also provide a direct link and QR code as alternatives for installing the software. In 
some later version of iBanking malware distribution, we saw an “Installation Guide” injected 
to the victim’s internet banking session, which aims to guide the user to install the “security 
certificate”. The “Installation Guide” has 5 steps, instructing the user to download, install, 
and use the app. In order to have the malware installed successfully, the installation guide 
also shows the user how to lower their mobile security by enabling unknown sources app 
installation and activating device administrator for the app. Figure 17 is a screenshot of an 
installation guide of one sample in the dataset. 
 
Figure 17 - iBanking malware Installation Guide 
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iBanking malware are normally configured to look like official mobile applications from a 
range of different banks and social networks; both the installation APK and the installed 
application are target-brand themed.  
Like other Android banking malware, iBanking malware requires various permissions upon 
installation, including but not limited to: personal information; receive, read, edit and send 
SMS; network communication; storage; phone calls; hardware controls; system tools; and 
development tools. These permissions give the attacker almost complete access to the 
handset including the capability to intercept voice and SMS communications. 
When a user starts iBanking malware, the malware asks the user to activate device 
administrator, which allows the application to erase the phone’s data without warning by 
performing a factory data reset, and controls how and when the screen locks. (Figure 18 
below).  
 
Figure 18 - iBanking malware ask for device administrator access 
After activating device administrator privileges, a target-brand-themed interface displays 
with a button to generate an “activation code”. This code is required to complete the 
“security certificate” installation from the user’s Internet banking session. After filling in the 
activation code on the fake Internet banking page, the user is redirected to their normal 
Internet banking pages. 
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3.4 Android Banking Malware Family Analysis 
 
3.4.1 Distribution and Installation 
 
All samples use social engineering techniques to spread. 
Zitmo, Spitmo, Citmo, Perkele, FakeBank, and iBanking malware work in tandem with 
traditional banking malware on Windows OS, using webinjects for distribution. SmsSpy and 
Svpeng malware are spread via spam emails and SMS or instant messages on mobile devices. 
Social engineering techniques are also applied to the appearance of these Android banking 
malware - all of the samples in the dataset had been disguised as applications that provide 
extra security or imitate well known applications such as Google Play Store and Adobe Flash 
Update.  
Of all the samples, only three Citmo samples had been found on Google Play. For all other 
samples, the potential victims must enable “Unknown Sources” from the device settings to 
be able to install the malware.  
3.4.2 Privilege and Permission 
 
All samples requests permissions for SMS functions, which was used by many banks to 
deliver their second-factor to authenticate an electronic funds transfer. Permissions to 
access personal information, network, phone calls and storage are also heavily required 
from the samples.  
Two malware families, iBanking and Svpeng, require the device administrator privilege to be 
activated upon application start. The iBanking malware family require basic device 
administrator privilege while Svpeng invoke a policy of setting storage encryption. To 
sustain this powerful privilege, the Svpeng family configure the device to prevent 
administrator privilege from being deactivated by a password.  
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3.4.3 Targeting region 
 
We observed that samples from the Zitmo, Spitmo, Citmo, Perkele , Svpeng and iBanking 
families initially targeted Russian-speaking users, some were then spread to other European 
countries and English speaking counties (mainly US). The Fakebank family was first seen 
targeting Korean speaking users, then found targeting European banks.  
 
3.4.4 Android Emulator vs. Native Device 
 
During manual dynamic analysis, all but one malware sample ran successfully in both the 
emulator environment and on native device. The exception was a sample of the iBanking 
family; it crashes on launch in the emulator. 
 
3.5  Automated Dynamic Analysis 
 
Automated dynamic analysis was performed to understand how the malware behaves when 
executed,  e.g which C&C service it communicates with, what application is installed, and 
what service is enabled when the application is executed etc.. As a part of this analysis, we 
used the Android application sandbox - Droidbox[66] to generate behavioural graphs for each 
sample, and these provide the basis of the development patterns to aid in malware 
identification and detection. 
DroidBox is a dynamic analysis tool for Android applications targeting Android OS. The tool 
is based on TaintDroid[67] for detecting information leaks but has been extended, by 
modifying the Android framework, to monitor API calls of interest invoked by an application. 
Applications are executed within the Android SDK emulator, and logs are collected in the 
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host operating system each monitored behaviour. For each sample, DroidBox created a log 
file and generated two graphs visualizing the behaviour. 
DroidBox was designed to collect information about a sample and its activities during 
interaction over a fixed time period. In this research, each sample is executed for 60 seconds 
to enable simpler comparison of the output of samples. (Other research on malware for 
Windows computers indicates that 60 seconds is sufficient to extract the important 
information[68]) 
DroidBox generates a text-based report on completion of analysis, including: 
a) File Activities 
b) Crypto API activities 
c) Network activity 
d) DexClassLoader 
e) Broadcast Receivers 
f) Started Services 
g) Enforced permissions 
h) Permission bypassed 
i) Information leakage 
j) Sent SMS 
k) Phone calls 
Additionally, two images are generated visualizing the behaviour of the sample. One shows 
the temporal order of the operations with a timestamp. The other being a “treemap” 
showing the service started by the particular sample after installed. This can be used to 
discover behavioural similarity between analysed samples. 
It was observed that the majority of the samples in the dataset have very similar treemaps. 
All of our samples contains three sections in their Treemaps: SERVICE, FILEWRITE, and 
FILEREAD. Figure 19 is a tree graph of a Citmo sample analysis: 
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Figure 19 – Citmo Tree Graph 
It was also observed from text based reports that all samples have activities with Broadcast 
Receivers and Started services.  
 
3.5.1 Broadcast Receivers  
 
While executing samples in Droidbox, it was observed that almost all of them listened to 
broadcast receivers such as BOOT_COMPLETE and SMS_RECEIVED. The Android system 
sends broadcasts to receivers to announce events such as receiving incoming calls or 
messages. Applications can also send broadcast messages as ‘intent messages’ to the 
system, for example, indicating that applications are waiting for an event. Utilizing 
broadcast receivers, malware can be designed to listen for incoming messages and forward 
them to pre-determined mobile phone numbers. This is one of the key features of Android 
banking malware. Figure 16 shows a snapshot of the Fakebank sample report. 
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Figure 20 - Fakebank Broadcast Receiver 
 
3.5.2 Started Services 
 
For Android OS, a Service is an application component that can perform long-running 
operations in the background and does not provide a user interface. An application 
component can start a service and it will continue to run in the background even if the user 
switches to another application. Additionally, a component can bind to a service to interact 
with it and perform inter-process communication (IPC)[69]. A service is "started" when an 
application component (such as an activity) starts it by calling startService(). Once started, a 
service can run in the background indefinitely, even if the component that started it is 
destroyed. 
It was observed that all of the samples started some services while under dynamic analysis. 
Figure 21 is an example from the Svpeng sample analysis report. 
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Figure 21  – Svpeng Started Services 
 
Because services do not provide a user interface and run silently in the background, they 
can be employed by malware developers to carry on malicious activities. In the above 
example, DownloadService and SmsReceiverService started are very suspicious because 
download service can be used to download other malicious applications on to the device, 
and SmsReceiverService can be leveraged to intercept incoming SMS on the device. 
 
3.5.3 SMS Sent 
 
Droidbox also logs if an application sends an SMS out. We observed that none of the 
samples sent SMS during dynamic analysis with Droidbox. This might be because the SMS 
activity is only triggered by an incoming SMS event. Like other automated malware analysis 
tools, Droidbox has only limited interaction with the application, so that SMS forwarding 
activity was not captured by analysis. This assumption was validated using static analysis, 
the results of which are presented in the next chapter. 
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3.6  Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, manual and automated dynamic analysis was performed against our 
malware sample dataset.   
During manual analysis, malware samples were installed and executed in both Android 
emulator and native device where possible. We observed the permissions required for each 
sample upon installation, as well as the look and behaviour upon application start. We also 
investigated the history of each malware family and their corresponding distribution 
methods. From manual analysis results, we summarized our dataset from the following 
perspectives: Distribution and Installation, Privilege and Permission, Targeting region and 
Android Emulator vs. Native Device. 
During automated analysis, we piped all malware samples to DroidBox and ran them for 60 
seconds then analysed the logs and graphs that generated by DroidBox.  We observed some 
common malware behaviours, and some similarities in malware activities.  
Given dynamic analysis only exploits one execution path; it may not be effective if a special 
user interaction is required to trigger the malicious activity. The next chapter presents the 
results of reverse engineering the samples using static analysis tools to obtain deeper 
understanding of Android banking malware.  
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CHAPTER 4: Android Banking Malware Static 
Analysis and Evolution in Techniques 
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4.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
Malware static analysis is the actual viewing of malware code and walking through it to get 
a better understanding of the malware and its behaviour. A common method for analysing 
malware code on Android OS is malware reverse engineering - the process of disassembling 
or decompiling malicious Android apps using a variety of tools, in order to analyse and 
understand its structure, function, and operation. 
In this chapter, we employed a set of tools to reverse engineer all malware samples in the 
dataset, then statistically analysed malware code with a focus on certain functions. From 
code analysis, we validated the assumptions from the previous chapter; furthermore, we 
gained a better understanding of Android banking malware inner working and application 
logic. 
For each malware family, we compared source code from earlier samples with source code 
from later samples to identify any continuous developments and improvements of malware 
code over time. For one malware family, we found new techniques in malware code, and 
then dissected the new techniques and how these techniques made the malware more 
effective. 
 
4.2 Tools 
 
A few manual and automatic tools are used in static analysis to assist Android malware 
reverse engineering: 
 
 4.2.1 APKtool  
 
APKtool is a command line tool for reverse engineering Android applications. It can 
decompile the application source to its nearly original form and recompile it after applying 
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certain changes. It can be employed for Android application debugging; we mainly use it to 
determine the malicious activity in the application.  
 
4.2.2 Dex2jar 
 
Android applications are commonly written in Java and compiled to bytecode for the Java 
virtual machine, which is then translated to Dalvik bytecode and stored in .dex (Dalvik 
EXecutable) files. The main application logic is present in a classes.dex file but it is not 
viewable by user. Therefore Dex2jar was developed to convert .dex file into human 
readable .jar format[70]. 
 
4.2.3 JD-GUI 
 
JD-GUI is a standalone graphical utility that displays Java code, mainly .class and .jar files. JD-
GUI is a part of the “Java Decompiler project” which aims to develop tools in order to 
decompile and analyse java 5 byte code and later versions. JD-GUI handles decompilation 
of .class binaries, presenting the source in a structured hierarchy.  Essentially, we use JD-GUI 
to view .jar file that is converted by Dex2jar.  
 
4.3 Static Analysis 
 
Android OS is developed by Open Handset Alliance, led by Google, and is based upon the 
Linux kernel and GNU software. Android application package files use the .apk (Android 
application package) extension. APK files are used to install applications onto Android OS. 
Each Android application is compiled and packaged in a single APK file that includes all of 
the application's code (.dex files), resources, assets, and manifest file. APK files are ZIP files 
formatted packages based on the JAR file format, with the .apk file extension. The source 
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files can be extracted easily from Android applications using a ZIP decompression program. 
It means that after compiling the source files, they do not perform cryptographic operations. 
When uncompressed, the following folders and files can be found inside APK files (Table 4): 
 
 
Table 4 - Archive that APK files contain 
In static analysis, we focused on two main files in the APK: AndroidManifest.xml and 
classes.dex, as well as the internal resource folder - res.  
 
4.3.1 AndroidManifest.xml 
 
The Android manifest is an XML file that each application must include, which describes the 
application's package name, version, components (activities, intent filters, services), 
imported libraries, activities, and more[71]. 
APKTool is used to extract the AndroidManifest.xml files from the APKs to identify the 
permissions requested by each application.  
By default, a basic Android application has no permissions assigned to it, which means it 
cannot do anything to impact the user experience or any data on the device. To make use of 
protected features of the device, an Android application developer must include one or 
more <uses-permission> tags in AndroidManifest.xml to declare the permissions that the 
application needs. When a user installs an application, permissions requested by the 
application are granted to it by the package installer, based on checks against the signatures 
of the applications declaring those permissions and/or interaction with the user[72]. This is 
an “All or nothing” choice for the user - the application is either granted all permissions that 
Contents Description
assets Package with an external resource folder
res Package with an internal resource folder
META-INF Program information data itself, the folder containing the signed certificate
classes.dex Implication of the class file with the information
resources.arsc Compiled file into a separate resource
AndroidManifest.xml File containing general information about Android Application
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it requested when installed, or no permission is granted and the application will not be 
installed. The user cannot selectively grant permissions to an application. After the 
permissions are granted to the application, there will not be any further checks with the 
user when the application is started or running. It should be noted that Android developers 
can define their own permissions to protect their applications from being exploited; 
however, we focus only on the set of permissions defined in the official documentation[73]. 
Figure 22 is an example of user permissions stated in AndroidManifest.xml of an Android 
banking malware sample that belongs to the family of Perkele.  
 
 
Figure 22  - user permissions declared in AndroidManifest.xml 
 
In this example, the malicious Android application requires three permissions upon 
installation. These permissions allow the application to write to external storage 
(WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE); monitor, record or perform processing on incoming 
messages (RECEIVE_SMS) and to send out SMS messages (SEND_SMS). 
Using the same method, we extracted all required permissions from every sample in our 
data set, and then put them together for statistical analysis. Table 5 is the distribution of 
user permissions requested by all samples in the dataset. We use the first column to 
indicate the percentage of applications requesting a corresponding permission. 
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Table 5 - APK user permission distribution 
 
We observed that all of the samples in our dataset request permission to monitor, record or 
perform processing on incoming SMS (RECEIVE_SMS), 89.19% of samples require permission 
to send out SMS (SEND_SMS) AND 86.49% of the samples require permission to open 
network sockets – accessing the Internet (INTERNET).  
We also observed that READ_PHONE_STATE, ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, and 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permissions are largely required by more than half of the 
samples. READ_PHONE_STATE permission allows an application to access to phone state, 
<user-permission>
100.00% RECEIVE_SMS                                     
89.19% SEND_SMS                                 
86.49% READ_PHONE_STATE                                
86.49% INTERNET                                
70.27% READ_SMS                          
62.16% WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE                       
56.76% ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE                     
45.95% WRITE_SMS                 
40.54% CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE               
40.54% RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED                         
40.54% ACCESS_WIFI_STATE               
40.54% CHANGE_WIFI_STATE               
35.14% READ_CONTACTS             
35.14% WAKE_LOCK             
32.43% CALL_PHONE            
24.32% RECORD_AUDIO         
24.32% SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW         
18.92% BROADCAST_SMS       
18.92% DISABLE_KEYGUARD       
18.92% WRITE_SETTINGS       
16.22% MODIFY_PHONE_STATE      
16.22% BROADCAST_STICKY      
16.22% INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW      
16.22% ADD_SYSTEM_SERVICE      
16.22% RECORDER_TASKS      
16.22% CHANGE_CONFIGURATION      
16.22% STATUS_BAR      
16.22% DEVICE_POWER      
16.22% WRITE_APN_SETTINGS      
16.22% BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH      
16.22% UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS      
16.22% WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS      
13.51% MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS     
8.11% WRITE_CONTACTS   
8.11% INSTALL_PACKAGES   
8.11% DELETE_PACKAGES   
8.11% ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION   
8.11% INSTALL_SHORTCUT   
5.41% MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS  
5.41% ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION  
2.70% PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS 
2.70% CALL_PRIVILEGED 
2.70% GET_TASKS 
2.70% RESTART_PACKAGES 
2.70% KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES 
2.70% READ_LOGS 
2.70% READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS 
2.70% BROADCAST_PACKAGE_INSTALL 
2.70% BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REPLACED 
sample user permission distribution
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ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission allows an application to access information about 
networks and WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission allows an application to write to 
external storage. However, these three permissions are widely requested in both malicious 
and benign applications[74].  Thus we don’t consider these three as unique feature of 
Android banking malware. 
Besides receive and send SMS, collected samples clearly tend to request other SMS related 
permissions, such as READ_SMS (70.27%) and WRITE_SMS (45.95%). This indicates that SMS 
functions are heavily abused by Android banking malware; therefore, we focused more on 
SMS function in later static analysis. 
Further investigation shows that all samples require SEND_SMS permission, INTERNET 
permission, or both. This means any sample that does not require SEND_SMS permission, 
will ask for INTERNET permission, and vice versa. This provides an indication as to how 
malware forwards SMS back to cybercriminals - RECEIVE_SMS permission enables SMS 
interception; once intercepted, SMS is forwarded to cybercriminals by SMS (SEND_SMS) or 
HTTP POST (INTERNET), or both. This assumption, based on the inspection of 
AndroidManifest.xml file, was validated in later static analysis. 
 
4.3.2 classes.dex 
 
classes.dex is compressed program code of Android application. Android application is 
written in Java and compiled to bytecode for the Java virtual machine, which is then 
translated to Dalvik bytecode and stored in classes.dex (Dalvik EXecutable) file. The compact 
Dalvik Executable format is designed for systems that are constrained in terms of memory 
and processor speed[75]. 
In order to have a better understanding of the malware code, we employed dex2jar to 
decompile the application package files into JAR format, which can be read by a Java 
decompiler – JD-GUI. JD-GUI handles decompilation of .class binaries, presenting the source 
in a structured hierarchy.  
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As the main target of Android malware static analysis, classes.dex file contains implicit 
information.  It helps us to understand the inner works and logic of the application. 
Analysis of AndroidManifest.xml file shows SMS related functions what we want to further 
investigate in static analysis. SMS is a unique feature that mobile has as opposed to PCs. 
More importantly, it has been used by many banks and financial institutions as an out-of-
band authentication factor[76] (mTAN) in their Online Banking authentication controls. This 
means if a cybercriminal wants to make a fraudulent electronic funds transfer, knowing only 
the victim’s login and password is not enough, the cybercriminal also need to know the 
security code that is sent to the victim’s mobile phone via SMS. Therefore, SMS stealing 
became a key feature of Android banking malware. 
In this respect, we inspected source code of all malware samples, with a focus on SMS 
related functions. From source code analysis, we validated our assumption - all samples 
have functions to intercept SMS and forward SMS on to the cybercriminal. 
The example below is from analysis of iBanking malware sample, where the malware 
intercepts SMS and forwards to cybercriminal via SMS: 
 
Figure 23 - smsParser.class 
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In class smsParser , a Turkish phone number +4367676800505127 was hard coded and 
assigned to a few different variables – tel1, tel1_1, tel_temp, tel2.  
These variables are later used in different classes and methods, below screenshot shows a 
method called hackSMS; in this method , an intercepted SMS message is logged to a server 
under the cybercriminals control. The SMS is also forwarded to the Turkish number which 
was hard coded in smsParser class (Figure 23).  
 
 
Figure 24 – hackSMS method 
 
This piece of analysis indicates that the phone number +4367676800505127 is under 
cybercriminal control. Further investigations can be carried on to trace more details about 
the cybercriminal. 
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4.4 Evolution in techniques  
 
Static analysis of samples from the same malware family but different time periods also 
reveals the improvements and evolutions of malware coding techniques. 
In this respect, I compared static analysis of two iBanking samples: 
 
 
Table 6 – Compare Two iBanking Malware Samples 
 
iBanking Sample:  e1b86054468d6ac1274188c0c579ccaf.apk was first seen by VirusTotal in 
November 2013. Dynamic analysis using Android Emulator indicates that it targets a 
European bank. Malware requests to activate device administrator privilege upon start and 
it has a button to generate a “security code”, which was actually just a meaningless code.  
Static analysis indicated that the malware could communicate with and accept commands 
from a C&C webserver and a phone number. C&C domains are defined in 
res/values/arrays.xml (Figure 25) 
 
 
Figure 25 –Contents of arrays.xml from 
 
MD5 First seen by VT
e1b86054468d6ac1274188c0c579ccaf 19/11/2013
df1c6dfb6830ba845231af26d80354de 5/04/2014
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It iterates the list of C&C web servers and checks if they are active via HTTP POST to 
{domain}/iBanking/sms/ping.php 
If the server responded as expected, it will POST to {domain}/iBanking/sms/index.php 
(Figure 26) 
a) bot_id (defined in strings.xml) 
b) telephone number 
c) iccid, device model 
d) OS version 
e) IMEI 
f) control number (this is the C&C phone number) 
 
Figure 26 – Malware code to steal device info 
 
The malware can be controlled by SMS or HTTP command. 
If the commands come from SMS, it needs to validate the C&C number (+790xxxxxx45), 
alternatively, commands can come via HTTP by polling {domain}/iBanking/sms/sync.php 
The malware also predefined the following command strings: 
a) sms start - start intercepting and reading SMS 
b) sms stop - stop intercepting and reading SMS 
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c) call start  - forward calls to +790xxxxxx45 
d) call stop - stop call forwarding 
e) change num -  update the C&C phone number 
f) sms list - read SMS inbox and sent messages and POST to 
{domain}/iBanking/getList.php 
g) call list - read call history and POST to {domain}/iBanking/getList.php 
h) start record - start audio recording. The file is saved as 
{externaldir}/Android/obb/{dd-MM-yyyy_HH-mm-ss}.txt. The files are then sent to 
{domain}/iBanking/sendFile.php 
i) stop record -   stop recording 
j) sendSMS  - send intercepted SMS to the C&C phone number. 
k) contact list - get contact list 
l) wipe data - wipe data (malware ask for device administrator to be activated upon 
starting). 
m) ping - check if the CnC server is active 
iBanking Sample:  df1c6dfb6830ba845231af26d80354de.apk was first seen by VirusTotal in 
April 2014, analysis shows that this malware targets two Australian banks in the same way 
as sample e1b86054468d6ac1274188c0c579ccaf.apk. Malicious functions of these two 
malware are identical, however, our analysis discovered that the later sample had a few 
significant improvements in coding, which including anti-SDK/VM, data encryption, and 
code obfuscation. 
4.4.1 Anti-SDK/VM 
Dynamic analysis using Android Emulator doesn’t work well for this new sample - the app 
crashes upon starting. Static analysis shows the malware had improved the code to detect 
an SDK/VM environment. The below piece of code in onCreate() method shows exactly how 
this was done: 
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Figure 27 – iBanking malware Emulator Detection Code 
 
On starting, the malware checks if one of the following condition is true: 
a) Device IMEI = 000000000000000  
b) Phone number start with 155521  
c) Operator is Android  
d) Sim Serial Number = 89014103211118510720 
These hard coded values are commonly used in Android Emulator and app analysis 
environments. The app will terminate itself and appear to crash if any of these conditions is 
true. 
4.4.2 AES Encryption 
 
Static analysis shows that sample df1c6dfb6830ba845231af26d80354de.apk protects itself 
using AES encryption. In order to hide its different resources, this iBanking sample made use 
of a hardcoded private key (within the app) that encrypted the contents of XML and 
communication resources. XML included data relating to external resources such as imagery, 
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but also information relating to the app’s settings. Encryption was also applied to the app’s 
communication resources including both URLs and telephone control numbers. 
 
Figure 28 – iBanking malware AES Encryption 
 
4.4.3 Code Obfuscation  
 
Another evasion technique that the malware used is code obfuscation.  
Obfuscation increased the number of classes to 238, assigning random names to the newly 
created classes. The old variant (e1b86054468d6ac1274188c0c579ccaf.apk) only has 33 
classes. 
Obfuscation also replaced all static variable names with meaningless strings and encoded 
string values. The obfuscator was smart enough to avoid encoding/obfuscating system 
variables such as “app_name”. String encoding was done with a hardcoded, relatively simple 
function. 
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Figure 29 – iBanking malware Code Obfuscation 
 
4.5 Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, static analysis was performed against our malware sample dataset.   
During static analysis, we tried reverse engineering malware samples using open source 
tools and analysed malware functions by inspecting a few main files of Android malware. 
We statistically compared permissions being requested by all samples in our data set. We 
also gain a better understanding in regards how does Android banking malware intercept 
and steal SMS. 
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During static analysis, we also discovered the evolution in malware coding techniques. This 
discovery indicated the fast development of the underground economy and level of 
maturity of Android banking malware. This chapter highlights that temporal evolution of the 
malware is important aspect of malware analysis.   
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 
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In the past few years mobile banking has been growing exponentially. Banks are moving 
online-banking from PC to mobile phone, which provides greater flexibility for both bank 
customers and at the same creates more opportunities for cybercriminals. Attackers have 
been releasing malware for PCs, but now there are attackers who are now targeting 
smartphones especially Android OS.  In this thesis, we investigated a particular group of 
Android malware which is designed to target banks and financial institutions.  
We firstly presented a framework to symmetrically analyse the collected malware samples. 
The framework consists of malware life cycle analysis, behavioural analysis and static 
analysis. 
Before conducting the analysis, we presented literature review and background knowledge 
of PC malware, Android malware and malware families. We also presented two main 
malware analysis types: behaviour and static analysis, followed by how the malware analysis 
laboratory is set up.  
In Chapter 3, manual and automated dynamic analysis was performed against collected 
malware sample dataset. Observations of malware behaviour have been statistically 
analysed. 
Below are the observations: 
 Most samples in the dataset works in tandem with the traditional PC/Windows 
malware, aiming to steal the second factor passed via mobile phone, which could be 
later used to complete fraudulent transactions 
 All samples requested permissions for SMS functions, which was used by many 
financial institutions to deliver their second-factor to authenticate an electronic 
funds transfer. Permissions to access personal information, network, phone calls and 
storage are also heavily required from the samples.  
 All sample Android banking malware started with targeting one region then spread 
globally. 
  All samples has similar behaviour when executed, as broadcast-receivers and 
started-services are the two services that all sample malware manipulate.  
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To gain better and deeper understanding of Android banking malware, we performed static 
analysis in Chapter 4 and presented the analysis results. We also managed to discover a 
temporal evolution of a particular Android banking malware family. 
Main observations from static analyses are: 
 All of the samples in our dataset request permission to monitor, record or perform 
processing on incoming SMS (RECEIVE_SMS).  
 All samples require either SEND_SMS permission (89.19%) or INTERNET permission 
(86.49%). or both.  
 Android banking malware have been examining fast anti-reversing techniques and 
evasion from these techniques have been added to newer versions to gain higher 
penetration rate and create additional barrier for forensic analysis.   
 
In this thesis, we analysed all malware sample in our dataset by adopting proposed 
framework for systematic analysis of Android Banking Malware (FAM). FAM can standardise 
Android banking malware analysis process to achieve quick understanding of malware 
behaviour and minimize the possible harm caused by new type of malware by employing 
mitigation controls. 
FAM can also help to improve antimalware system from our obseration. By analysing a 
larger banking malware data set and also a large genuine banking app data set, we can 
analytically analyse and compare the results from FAM. The results can help to discover the 
pattern of android banking malware behaviour and the services that android malware 
usually starts on the infected device, which can be further used to improve antimalware 
system for better malware detection and identification.        
 mitigation contr ols. 
5.1 Future Work 
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Since mobile banking malware is a fairly new topic, this thesis mainly focussed on 
understanding the malicious behaviour and functions which were also validated using our 
proposed FAM. When we analyse Android banking malware in FAM, significant manual 
analysis was performed to understand malware code and configuration. One opportunity 
for future work is to optimize and automate FAM, so that Android banking malware analysis 
can be performed both more quickly and by people with minimal coding experience. 
As demonstrated in this thesis, Android banking malware is an evolving field, and so future 
work will include enhancing and improving FAM, and ongoing analysis to monitor the 
evolution of Android banking malware.    
Further analysis of samples by FAM will enable future work on development of a system to 
automatically detect and validate banking malware on Android operating system.  
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Appendix A 
REMnux: A Linux Toolkit for Reverse-Engineering and Analyzing 
Malware[77] 
 
REMnux® is a free Linux toolkit for assisting malware analysts with reverse-engineering malicious 
software. It strives to make it easier for forensic investigators and incident responders to start using 
the variety of freely-available tools that can examine malware, yet might be difficult to locate or set 
up. 
The heart of the REMnux® project is the REMnux Linux distribution based on Ubuntu. This 
lightweight distribution incorporates many tools for analysing Windows and Linux malware, 
examining browser-based threats such as obfuscated JavaScript, exploring suspicious document files 
and taking apart other malicious artefacts. Investigators can also use the distribution to intercept 
suspicious network traffic in an isolated lab when performing behavioural malware analysis. 
Download the REMnux Virtual Appliance 
The simplest way to get the distribution is to download the REMnux virtual appliance file in the OVA 
format.  
The file is around 2GB in size; its SHA-256 hash is 
C26BE9831CA414F5A4D908D793E0B8934470B3887C48CFE82F86943236968AE6. 
Be sure to only download the OVA file from the link off this official REMnux website and validate 
that the file’s hash matches the one above. Note that Internet Explorer or Edge browsers might 
rename the OVA file to have the .tar extension; if this happens, simply rename the file to have 
the .ova extension. 
You’ll need to install virtualization software such as VMware Workstation Player, VMware 
Workstation Pro, VMware Fusion and VirtualBox prior to using the REMnux virtual appliance. 
Import the REMnux Virtual Appliance 
Once you’ve downloaded the REMnux OVA file, import it into your virtualization software, then start 
the virtual machine. For step-by-step instructions for importing the virtual appliance, take a look at 
the VirtualBox screenshot and VMware Workstation screenshot slideshows. 
There is no need to extract contents of the OVA file manually before importing it. Simply load the 
OVA file into your virtualization software to begin the import. If you attempt to extract OVA file’s 
contents and try importing the embedded OVF file in VirtualBox, you will likely encounter an error, 
such as “could not verify the content of REMnux.mf against the available files, unsupported digest 
type.” 
If importing into QEMU, extract contents of the OVA file and run the qemu-img command like this: 
tar xvf remnux-6.0-ova-public.ova 
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qemu-img convert -O qcow2 REMnuxV6-disk1.vmdk remnux.qcow2 
In all cases, once you boot up the imported virtual machine, it will automatically log you into the 
system using the user named “remnux”. The user’s password is “malware”; you might need to 
specify it when performing privileged operations. 
After booting into the virtual appliance, run the update-remnux full command on REMnux to update 
its software. This will allow you to benefit from any enhancements introduced after the virtual 
appliance has been packaged. Your system needs to have Internet access for this to work. 
Install REMnux on an Existing System 
As an alternative to downloading the virtual appliance, you can run the REMnux installation script on 
an existing Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit system. This allows you to install REMnux on a physical host or a 
virtual machine. You can use this method to add REMnux software and settings to a brand new 
system or to the host you’ve been using for a while. SIFT Workstation users can utilize this approach 
to combine SIFT and REMnux into a single system. 
If you’d like to build a REMnux system from scratch, use the Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit minimal ISO as the 
starting point. If building a virtual machine, allocate at least 1GB of RAM and 25GB disk (more 
recommended). When going through the Ubuntu installer, consider creating the user named 
“remnux” with the password “malware”, though any credentials will work. For step-by-step 
instructions, see the screenshots of the Ubuntu installation steps. 
Once you’ve logged into the newly-built or existing system compatible with REMnux, run the 
following command to install the REMnux distribution: 
wget --quiet -O - https://remnux.org/get-remnux.sh | sudo bash 
This installation script will configure your system and download and install the necessary software 
without asking you any questions. It requires Internet access to accomplish this. The installer will run 
for approximately 45 minutes, depending on the strength of your system and the speed of your 
Internet connection. 
A handful of people running the installation script within virtual machines noticed that the antivirus 
tool installed on their underlying host flagged some REMnux packages as malicious and blocked their 
download. This is a false alarm. However, if you encounter this, you might need to disable the host’s 
anivirus tool while running the script or whitelist the offending files or URLs to avoid getting them 
blocked. 
Connecting the REMnux Virtual Appliance to the Internet 
The REMnux virtual appliance is initially configured to use the “NAT” mode, so it can connect to the 
Internet through the host on which it is running. This way, if your underlying host has Internet 
connectivity, REMnux should be able to access the Internet as well. You can isolate REMnux within 
your lab by configuring the virtual appliance to use a “host only” network. After switching networks, 
run the renew-dhcp command in REMnux to refresh its network settings. 
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Some of the REMnux tools are designed to run in an isolated laboratory environment, so you can 
perform behavioural analysis of malicious software running in the lab. In this case, configure 
REMnux use a virtual network without Internet connectivity. Other tools are designed to allow you 
to explore suspicious websites and interact with online resources; REMnux will need to be 
connected to an Internet-accessible network when performing these tasks. 
Installing Virtualization Tools on REMnux 
When running REMnux on a VMware platform, it’s usually a good idea to install VMware Tools 
within the virtual machine. This will allow the REMnux screen resolution to automatically adjust to 
match your monitor’s geometry. It will also provide some additional enhancements, such as the 
opportunity to share clipboard contents across your underlying host and the virtual machine. 
When running REMnux on VMware Workstation, Player or ESX, the simplest way to install VMware 
Tools using the open VM tools package by running the following command on REMnux, assuming it’s 
connected to the Internet: 
sudo apt-get install open-vm-tools-desktop 
On VMware Fusion, the best approach is to install proprietary VMware Tools. To do this, activate the 
VMware Tools installation via Virtual Machine > Install VMware Tools, then run the command sudo 
install-vmware-tools on REMnux. You can install VMware Tools this way on VMware Workstation 
and Player as well. For additional details, see the VMware article on this topic. 
Please note that if you wish to use the shared folders feature of VMware, you will need to install 
proprietary VMware Tools with several adjustments to compensate for a compatibility issue 
between VMware Tools and the Ubuntu-supplied Linux kernel. These steps are described in an 
article devoted to this topic. A more practical option for transferring files in and out of REMnux 
might be to use SFTP through the installed SSH server (sshd start) instead of using shared folders. 
If using VirtualBox, consider installing Guest Additions software. To accomplish this, first shut down 
the REMnux virtual machine, then use the VirtalBox menu Devices > Insert guest additions CD image, 
and then start up the VM. Mount the virtual CD containing Guest Additions software like this and 
reboot: 
sudo mount /dev/sr0 /mnt/cdrom 
sudo /mnt/cdrom/VBoxLinuxAdditions.* 
Updating Your REMnux System 
To update REMnux after connecting your system to the Internet, simply run the update-remnux 
command. This tool will update the software that comprises the REMnux distribution, which 
includes the applications installed from standard Ubuntu and the REMnux-specific repository. The 
updater will also install any tools added to the distribution after your last update.  
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Appendix B 
MobiSec - Mobile security testing live environment [78] 
 
The MobiSec Live Environment Mobile Testing Framework project is a live environment for testing 
mobile environments, including devices, applications, and supporting infrastructure. The purpose is 
to provide attackers and defenders the ability to test their mobile environments to identify design 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The MobiSec Live Environment provides a single environment for 
testers to leverage the best of all available open source mobile testing tools, as well as the ability to 
install additional tools and platforms, that will aid the penetration tester through the testing process 
as the environment is structured and organized based on an industry¬‐proven testing framework. 
Using a live environment provides penetration testers the ability to boot the MobiSec Live 
Environment on any Intel-¬based system from a DVD or USB flash drive, or run the test environment 
within a virtual machine. 
DVD Installation Instructions 
Once the ISO file is downloaded, the user will need to burn it to a DVD. The method and steps for 
burning a DVD differs depending on the operating system. The link below provides instructions on 
how to burn a DVD using Mac, Windows, and Ubuntu operating systems. 
https://help.ubuntu.com/community/BurningIsoHowto 
From our own experience on burning DVDs on Mac OSX, we have discovered that using the hdiutil 
command line utility works well if there are issues using Mac OSX Disk Utility. Instructions on using 
this command line utility can be found at the link below. 
http://developer.apple.com/library/mac/#documentation/Darwin/Reference/ManPages/man1/hdiu
til.1.html 
Once the DVD has been successfully burned, insert the DVD into the computer to be used for testing, 
and boot the computer. Be sure to either configure the BIOS to have the computer attempt to boot 
from the CD/DVD player before booting from the hard disk, or press the appropriate key sequence 
during boot up to present the boot manager window. On a typical Intel computer, pressing the F12 
key during boot up will present a Boot Manager, which then provides the ability to select and boot 
from the CD/DVD drive. On an Intel-¬‐based Mac computer, pressing the option key during startup 
will present the Startup Manager, which then provides the option to boot from the CD/DVD volume. 
USB Installation Instructions 
Once the ISO file is downloaded, the user will need to burn it to a USB. It is recommended to use the 
UNetbootin software to create the bootable Live USB for the Ubuntu operating system. UNetbootin 
is free and is available for Windows, Mac, and Linux. Use the links below to download and install 
UNetbootin, and then for creating a live USB bootable drive. 
Download & Install: 
Page | 83  
 
http://unetbootin.sourceforge.net/ 
Create live USB drive: 
http://sourceforge.net/apps/trac/unetbootin/wiki/guide 
Once the live USB drive has been successfully created, insert the USB flash drive into the USB port on 
the computer to be used for testing, and boot the computer. Be sure to either configure the BIOS to 
have the computer attempt to boot from the USB flash drive before booting from the hard disk, or 
press the appropriate key sequence during boot up to present the boot manager window. On a 
typical Intel computer, pressing the F12 key during boot up will present a Boot Manager, which then 
provides the ability to select and boot from the USB drive. On an Intel-¬‐based Mac computer, 
pressing the option key during startup will present the Startup Manager, which then provides the 
option to boot from the USB volume. 
Virtual Machine Installation Instructions 
Once the ISO file is downloaded, the user can create a virtual machine using either VMWare’s 
VMPlayer, or Virtual Box. Other virtual machine software may also work. Use one of the links below 
to download and install the desired virtual machine software 
VMPlayer: 
http://downloads.vmware.com/d/info/desktop_end_user_computing/vmware_player/4_0 
Virtual Box: 
https://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/Downloads https://www.virtualbox.org/manual/UserManual.html 
Once the desired virtual machine software is installed, use one of the links below for instructions on 
creating a virtual machine. 
VMPlayer: 
http://kb.vmware.com/selfservice/microsites/search.do?language=en_US&cmd=displayKC&external
Id=1002 
Virtual Box: 
http://www.virtualbox.org/manual/ch01.html#idp7595344 
Virtual Machine Configuration Settings 
The following configuration settings are recommended for installation of MobiSec onto a virtual 
machine: 
 Processor: 1 CPU 
 Memory: 2GB 
 Hard Disk Size: 15GB 
 CD/DVD: Use disc image MobiSec-¬‐#.#.#.iso 
 Bridged Network (preferred) 
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Once the virtual machine is created, it is recommended that the MobiSec Live Environment be 
installed on the virtual machine’s hard disk, which provides the ability to permanently retain updates 
configuration changes, and any additional tools installed by the user. 
Persistent Installation 
MobiSec offers two different methods of installation. Both of these are performed in the same way, 
the difference is the destination of the installation. When the system is booted, an installation icon 
will appear on the desktop. This icon launches the installation program. Depending on if MobiSec 
has been launched within a VM or from a DVD/USB drive, the installation will target the virtual 
environment or the base computer system. 
Installation Instructions 
Open a terminal window and enter the following commands: 
cd ~/Desktop 
sudo chmod +x ubiquity-gtkui.desktop 
Close the terminal window and then double-¬‐click on the Install RELEASE icon to install MobiSec 
permanently onto the virtual machine’s hard disk. Follow the install instructions, basically using 
the defaults. For the username and password, we recommend using mobisec:mobisec, with 
computer name of mobisec-¬‐desktop (the default). 
Once the installation is completed, the computer or virtual machine will need to be rebooted. Any 
updates, modifications, or new tool installations should be persistent going forward. 
Firewall Configuration "How To" Instructions 
1. Select System --> Administration --> Firewall configuration to start the firewall GUI 
2. When prompted for the administrative password type in "mobisec" 
3. To create a new firewall rule click on the "Add" button within the firewall GUI 
4. When the Add Rule dialog box appears click on the "Simple" tab to add a firewall rule 
5. Let's create a rule to allow connections to a Metasploit listener on port 4444 
6. Leave the first drop down box as "Allow", leave the second drop down box as "In", leave the 
third drop down box as "TCP" 
7. In the blank box next to the third drop down box enter "4444" to allow incoming 
connections to port 4444 
8. Click on the "Add" button from the "Add Rule" dialog box to add you new rule Once you've 
added a new rule you can verify that it is active. 
To verify open a terminal window and issue the following command (you can grep for the port 
number you just added) 
sudo iptables -L -n | grep 4444 
You should see output from the command similar to the following 
ACCEPT tcp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 tcp dpt:4444 
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You have now opened port 4444 for incoming connections 
How to Setup SSH on MobiSec  
For most testers, MobiSec will be installed on a VM running on their testing machine, however, I 
recently came across the need to run MobiSec on an ESXi server, and I don't want to have to use the 
vSphere client (which only runs on Windows) to access the "console" on the VM. I could setup VNC 
on MobiSec (maybe an idea for a future blog entry), but my needs today are just for using MobiSec 
as a BeEF server, and possibly for Metasploit. Neither of these tools require the Ubuntu GUI to setup 
and launch, so I decided on using SSH to remote access to MobiSec. The problem is, it's not setup for 
that as it wasn't something I thought of as a need until recently. So I'm including the instructions for 
setting up SSH using MobiSec v1.1, which is the latest release and is available on Source Forge at 
http://sourceforge.net/p/mobisec. I'm sure many of you already know how to setup a ssh server on 
Ubuntu, so these instructions will look familiar, however, there are a couple items to be aware of on 
MobiSec, so be sure to look through them before you get started. 
First, you will need to startup MobiSec and login. Hopefully by now you already know the default 
username and password is mobisec:mobisec. MobiSec by default comes with the OpenSSH server 
installed, but, if it's been removed, you can re-install it using apt-get 
 sudo apt-get install openssh-server 
The next step is to configure the SSH server, but before you do, it's a good idea to make a read-only 
backup copy of the config file. 
 sudo cp /etc/ssh/sshd_config /etc/ssh/sshd_config.backup 
 sudo chmod a-w /etc/ssh/sshd_config.backup 
Now you have a backup of the config file, use your favorite editor and edit the SSH server config file 
as root. 
 sudo vi /etc/ssh/sshd_config 
The SSH server needs to be configured to not permit root login and to allow only a specific user or 
users, such as mobisec. If you have added additional users to your MobiSec install, then you may 
want to add them as well, or instead of the mobisec user. 
 PermitRootLogin no 
 AllowUsers mobisec 
Now it's time to start the ssh server, or restart it if it's already running, to have the changes made to 
the config file take effect. Let's first check if it's running, which is always good to know how to do. 
 ps -ef | grep sshd 
Check the output for /usr/sbin/sshd running as root. If it's not running, then you can start it using 
this command: 
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 sudo /etc/init.d/ssh start 
If it's already running, then ssh will need to be restarted using this commend. 
 sudo /etc/init.d/ssh restart 
It is strongly recommended to use SSH keys instead of passwords for remote access, especially if 
MobiSec is, or will be, accessible on the Internet or even a large internal network. Creating the SSH 
key pair is performed on your remote (local) machine. It is recommended to create and use RSA 
(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) key type as the DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) key type is considered to 
be less secure, however, SSH will use either. The key pair must be created on the remote machine 
that will be connecting via SSH to MobiSec. For Mac OSX and Linux platforms, the key pair is 
generated using the ssh-keygen command. Firstly, a .ssh folder needs to be created, as this is where 
the ssh config file and rsa keys will be stored, and should have directory permissions set to be 700 
(drwx------). Once the directory is created and permissions set, the key pair can be generated and 
should be stored in the .ssh directory, and permissions set so that the public key (.pub file) is 644 (-
rw-r--r--), and the private key is set to 600 (-rw-------). 
 mkdir ~/.ssh 
 chmod 700 ~/.ssh 
 ssh-keygen -t rsa -f ~/.ssh/ssh_rsakey 
 chmod 644 ssh_rsakey.pub 
 chmod 600 ssh_rsakey 
If you're using Windows, then it is recommended to use PuttyGen (or similar product) to generate 
the RSA key pair. Be sure to select RSA protocol 2 (SSH-2 RSA) and use at least 2048 bits to generate 
the key. For help on generating RSA keys and setting up Putty for SSH, go to the link below. If you 
use PuttyGen to generate the keys, you will need to export the public key using the Conversion -> 
Export OpenSSH key function. If you created the key pair using ssh-keygen, then the private key will 
need to be converted for Putty by using the Conversion -> Import key function in PuttyGen. Be sure 
to continue reading below as it will provide the details for setting up Putty to connect to MobiSec. 
 http://theillustratednetwork.mvps.org/Ssh/copSSH-WinSCP-KeyPair.html 
Once the key pair is created, you'll need to copy the public key over to MobiSec. Since SSH is up and 
running, you can connect to MobiSec and copy the file over. But before you can do that, ssh has to 
be configured on the remote machine. For Mac OSX and Linux, the config file needs to be created 
and stored in the ~/.ssh folder 
 vi ~/.ssh/config 
To create the config file, you will need the IP address or resolvable hostname of MobiSec. The 
default port number for SSH is 22. If you need to use a different port number, it must be configured 
in both sshd_config on MobiSec, and in the config file on the remote machine, which of course need 
to be the same. To change the port number in the sshd_config on MobiSec, search for Port and 
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replace the number 22 with the desired port. Don't forget to restart SSH on MobiSec if you change 
the port number. The config file on the remote machine should look something like this: 
 Host ssh-mobisec 
      Hostname <enter IP address of MobiSec here> 
      Port     <port number that is configured in sshd_config on MobiSec> 
Once the config file is ready, connect to MobiSec via SSH using the following syntax: 
 ssh <username>@<hostname> 
So for our configuration, the command would be: 
 ssh mobisec@ssh-mobisec 
Enter the password for the mobisec user account (mobisec) and you should then be connected. 
Before we can copy the public rsa key file, we need to create a folder to store it in. The sshd_config 
file has a setting for the default location for authorized keys, which should 
be %h/.ssh/authorized_keys (the %h refers to the home directory of the current user, which for 
mobisec is /home/mobisec). 
 mkdir ~/.ssh 
Once the .ssh folder is created, the public rsa key can be copied over to MobiSec using the following 
syntax: 
 scp <local filename> <username>@<hostname>:<remote directory path/filename> 
To copy the public key that was just created to the mobisec home directory, the command would be: 
 scp ssh_rsakey.pub mobisec@ssh-mobisec:/home/mobisec/.ssh/authorized_keys 
Once the rsa public key is copied over to MobiSec, the sshd_config file must be modified to disable 
password authentication. Edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config and search for #PasswordAuthentication, and 
replace it with this: 
 PasswordAuthentication no 
Once the sshd_config file has been modified and saved, ssh must be restarted. 
 sudo /etc/init.d/ssh restart 
On your remote (local) machine, logout of the current ssh session and attempt to reconnect. 
 logout 
 ssh mobisec@ssh-mobisec 
You should now be logged in via ssh using your RSA key pair and not prompted for a password. 
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Appendix C 
Glossary: basic terminology of the Android platform[79] 
 
The list below defines some of the basic terminology of the Android platform.  
.apk file 
Android application package file. Each Android application is compiled and packaged in a single file 
that includes all of the application's code (.dex files), resources, assets, and manifest file. The 
application package file can have any name but must use the .apk extension. For example: 
myExampleAppname.apk. For convenience, an application package file is often referred to as an 
".apk".  
Related: Application. 
.dex file  
Compiled Android application code file.  
Android programs are compiled into .dex (Dalvik Executable) files, which are in turn zipped into a 
single .apk file on the device. .dex files can be created by automatically translating compiled 
applications written in the Java programming language. 
Action 
A description of something that an Intent sender wants done. An action is a string value assigned to 
an Intent. Action strings can be defined by Android or by a third-party developer. For example, 
android.intent.action.VIEW for a Web URL, or com.example.rumbler.SHAKE_PHONE for a custom 
application to vibrate the phone.  
Related: Intent. 
Activity 
A single screen in an application, with supporting Java code, derived from the Activity class. Most 
commonly, an activity is visibly represented by a full screen window that can receive and handle UI 
events and perform complex tasks, because of the Window it uses to render its window. Though an 
Activity is typically full screen, it can also be floating or transparent. 
adb 
Android Debug Bridge, a command-line debugging application included with the SDK. It provides 
tools to browse the device, copy tools on the device, and forward ports for debugging. If you are 
developing in Android Studio, adb is integrated into your development environment. See Android 
Debug Bridge for more information.  
Application 
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From a component perspective, an Android application consists of one or more activities, services, 
listeners, and intent receivers. From a source file perspective, an Android application consists of 
code, resources, assets, and a single manifest. During compilation, these files are packaged in a 
single file called an application package file (.apk).  
Related: .apk, Activity 
Canvas 
A drawing surface that handles compositing of the actual bits against a Bitmap or Surface object. It 
has methods for standard computer drawing of bitmaps, lines, circles, rectangles, text, and so on, 
and is bound to a Bitmap or Surface. Canvas is the simplest, easiest way to draw 2D objects on the 
screen. However, it does not support hardware acceleration, as OpenGL ES does. The base class is 
Canvas.  
Related: Drawable, OpenGL ES. 
Content Provider 
A data-abstraction layer that you can use to safely expose your application's data to other 
applications. A content provider is built on the ContentProvider class, which handles content query 
strings of a specific format to return data in a specific format. See Content Providers topic for more 
information.  
Related: URI Usage in Android 
Dalvik 
The Android platform's virtual machine. The Dalvik VM is an interpreter-only virtual machine that 
executes files in the Dalvik Executable (.dex) format, a format that is optimized for efficient storage 
and memory-mappable execution. The virtual machine is register-based, and it can run classes 
compiled by a Java language compiler that have been transformed into its native format using the 
included "dx" tool. The VM runs on top of Posix-compliant operating systems, which it relies on for 
underlying functionality (such as threading and low level memory management). The Dalvik core 
class library is intended to provide a familiar development base for those used to programming with 
Java Standard Edition, but it is geared specifically to the needs of a small mobile device. 
DDMS 
Dalvik Debug Monitor Service, a GUI debugging application included with the SDK. It provides screen 
capture, log dump, and process examination capabilities. If you are developing in Android Studio, 
DDMS is integrated into your development environment. See Using DDMS to learn more about the 
program. 
Dialog 
A floating window that acts as a lightweight form. A dialog can have button controls only and is 
intended to perform a simple action (such as button choice) and perhaps return a value. A dialog is 
not intended to persist in the history stack, contain complex layout, or perform complex actions. 
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Android provides a default simple dialog for you with optional buttons, though you can define your 
own dialog layout. The base class for dialogs is Dialog.  
Related: Activity. 
Drawable 
A compiled visual resource that can be used as a background, title, or other part of the screen. A 
drawable is typically loaded into another UI element, for example as a background image. A 
drawable is not able to receive events, but does assign various other properties such as "state" and 
scheduling, to enable subclasses such as animation objects or image libraries. Many drawable 
objects are loaded from drawable resource files — xml or bitmap files that describe the image. 
Drawable resources are compiled into subclasses of android.graphics.drawable. For more 
information about drawables and other resources, see Resources.  
Related: Resources, Canvas  
Intent 
An message object that you can use to launch or communicate with other applications/activities 
asynchronously. An Intent object is an instance of Intent. It includes several criteria fields that you 
can supply, to determine what application/activity receives the Intent and what the receiver does 
when handling the Intent. Available criteria include include the desired action, a category, a data 
string, the MIME type of the data, a handling class, and others. An application sends an Intent to the 
Android system, rather than sending it directly to another application/activity. The application can 
send the Intent to a single target application or it can send it as a broadcast, which can in turn be 
handled by multiple applications sequentially. The Android system is responsible for resolving the 
best-available receiver for each Intent, based on the criteria supplied in the Intent and the Intent 
Filters defined by other applications. For more information, see Intents and Intent Filters.  
Related: Intent Filter, Broadcast Receiver. 
Intent Filter 
A filter object that an application declares in its manifest file, to tell the system what types of Intents 
each of its components is willing to accept and with what criteria. Through an intent filter, an 
application can express interest in specific data types, Intent actions, URI formats, and so on. When 
resolving an Intent, the system evaluates all of the available intent filters in all applications and 
passes the Intent to the application/activity that best matches the Intent and criteria. For more 
information, see Intents and Intent Filters.  
Related: Intent, Broadcast Receiver. 
Broadcast Receiver  
An application class that listens for Intents that are broadcast, rather than being sent to a single 
target application/activity. The system delivers a broadcast Intent to all interested broadcast 
receivers, which handle the Intent sequentially.  
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Related: Intent, Intent Filter. 
Layout Resource 
An XML file that describes the layout of an Activity screen.  
Related: Resources 
Manifest File 
An XML file that each application must define, to describe the application's package name, version, 
components (activities, intent filters, services), imported libraries, and describes the various 
activities, and so on. See The AndroidManifest.xml File for complete information. 
Nine-patch / 9-patch / Ninepatch image 
A resizeable bitmap resource that can be used for backgrounds or other images on the device. See 
Nine-Patch Stretchable Image for more information.  
Related: Resources. 
OpenGL ES 
Android provides OpenGL ES libraries that you can use for fast, complex 3D images. It is harder to 
use than a Canvas object, but better for 3D objects. The android.opengl and 
javax.microedition.khronos.opengles packages expose OpenGL ES functionality.  
Related: Canvas, Surface 
Resources 
Nonprogrammatic application components that are external to the compiled application code, but 
which can be loaded from application code using a well-known reference format. Android supports a 
variety of resource types, but a typical application's resources would consist of UI strings, UI layout 
components, graphics or other media files, and so on. An application uses resources to efficiently 
support localization and varied device profiles and states. For example, an application would include 
a separate set of resources for each supported local or device type, and it could include layout 
resources that are specific to the current screen orientation (landscape or portrait). For more 
information about resources, see Resources and Assets. The resources of an application are always 
stored in the res/* subfolders of the project.  
Service 
An object of class Service that runs in the background (without any UI presence) to perform various 
persistent actions, such as playing music or monitoring network activity.  
Related: Activity 
Surface 
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An object of type Surface representing a block of memory that gets composited to the screen. A 
Surface holds a Canvas object for drawing, and provides various helper methods to draw layers and 
resize the surface. You should not use this class directly; use SurfaceView instead.  
Related: Canvas 
SurfaceView 
A View object that wraps a Surface for drawing, and exposes methods to specify its size and format 
dynamically. A SurfaceView provides a way to draw independently of the UI thread for resource-
intensive operations (such as games or camera previews), but it uses extra memory as a result. 
SurfaceView supports both Canvas and OpenGL ES graphics. The base class is SurfaceView.  
Related: Surface 
Theme 
A set of properties (text size, background color, and so on) bundled together to define various 
default display settings. Android provides a few standard themes, listed in R.style (starting with 
"Theme_").  
URIs in Android 
Android uses URI strings as the basis for requesting data in a content provider (such as to retrieve a 
list of contacts) and for requesting actions in an Intent (such as opening a Web page in a browser). 
The URI scheme and format is specialized according to the type of use, and an application can handle 
specific URI schemes and strings in any way it wants. Some URI schemes are reserved by system 
components. For example, requests for data from a content provider must use the content://. In an 
Intent, a URI using an http:// scheme will be handled by the browser.  
View 
An object that draws to a rectangular area on the screen and handles click, keystroke, and other 
interaction events. A view is a base class for most layout components of an Activity or Dialog screen 
(text boxes, windows, and so on). It receives calls from its parent object (see ViewGroup) to draw 
itself, and informs its parent object about where and how big it would like to be (which may or may 
not be respected by the parent). For more information, see View.  
Related: View Hierarchy, ViewGroup, Widget  
View Hierarchy 
An arrangement of View and ViewGroup objects that defines the user interface for each component 
of an app. The hierarchy consists of view groups that contain one or more child views or view groups. 
You can obtain a visual representation of a view hierarchy for debugging and optimization by using 
the Hierarchy Viewer that is supplied with the Android SDK.  
Related: View, ViewGroup  
ViewGroup 
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A container object that groups a set of child views. The view group is responsible for deciding where 
child views are positioned and how large they can be, as well as for calling each to draw itself when 
appropriate. Some view groups are invisible and are for layout only, while others have an intrinsic UI 
(for instance, a scrolling list box). View groups are all in the widget package, but extend ViewGroup.  
Related: View, View Hierarchy 
Widget 
One of a set of fully implemented View subclasses that render form elements and other UI 
components, such as a text box or popup menu. Because a widget is fully implemented, it handles 
measuring and drawing itself and responding to screen events. Widgets are all in the android.widget 
package.  
Window 
In an Android application, an object derived from the abstract class Window that specifies the 
elements of a generic window, such as the look and feel (title bar text, location and content of 
menus, and so on). Dialog and Activity use an implementation of this class to render a window. You 
do not need to implement this class or use windows in your application.  
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Appendix D 
Permission in Manifest class[80] 
 
Constants 
String ACCESS_CHECKIN_PROPERTIES  
Allows read/write access to the "properties" table in the checkin database, to change values 
that get uploaded.  
String ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION  
Allows an app to access approximate location.  
String ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION  
Allows an app to access precise location.  
String ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS  
Allows an application to access extra location provider commands.  
String ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE  
Allows applications to access information about networks.  
String ACCESS_NOTIFICATION_POLICY  
Marker permission for applications that wish to access notification policy.  
String ACCESS_WIFI_STATE  
Allows applications to access information about Wi-Fi networks.  
String ACCOUNT_MANAGER  
Allows applications to call into AccountAuthenticators.  
String ADD_VOICEMAIL  
Allows an application to add voicemails into the system.  
String ALLOCATE_AGGRESSIVE  
Allows an application to aggressively allocate disk space.  
String ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS  
Allows the app to answer an incoming phone call.  
String BATTERY_STATS  
Allows an application to collect battery statistics  
String BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE  
Must be required by an AccessibilityService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_APPWIDGET  
Allows an application to tell the AppWidget service which application can access 
AppWidget's data.  
String BIND_AUTOFILL  
Must be required by a AutofillService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_AUTO_FILL  
TODO(b/35956626): temporary until clients change to BIND_AUTOFILL  
Protection level: signature  
String BIND_CARRIER_MESSAGING_SERVICE  
This constant was deprecated in API level 23. Use BIND_CARRIER_SERVICES instead  
String BIND_CARRIER_SERVICES  
The system process that is allowed to bind to services in carrier apps will have this 
permission.  
String BIND_CHOOSER_TARGET_SERVICE  
Must be required by a ChooserTargetService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_CONDITION_PROVIDER_SERVICE  
Must be required by a ConditionProviderService, to ensure that only the system can bind to 
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it.  
String BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN  
Must be required by device administration receiver, to ensure that only the system can 
interact with it.  
String BIND_DREAM_SERVICE  
Must be required by an DreamService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_INCALL_SERVICE  
Must be required by a InCallService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_INPUT_METHOD  
Must be required by an InputMethodService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_MIDI_DEVICE_SERVICE  
Must be required by an MidiDeviceService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_NFC_SERVICE  
Must be required by a HostApduService or OffHostApduService to ensure that only the 
system can bind to it.  
String BIND_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SERVICE  
Must be required by an NotificationListenerService, to ensure that only the system can bind 
to it.  
String BIND_PRINT_SERVICE  
Must be required by a PrintService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_QUICK_SETTINGS_TILE  
Allows an application to bind to third party quick settings tiles.  
String BIND_REMOTEVIEWS  
Must be required by a RemoteViewsService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_SCREENING_SERVICE  
Must be required by a CallScreeningService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE  
Must be required by a ConnectionService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_TEXT_SERVICE  
Must be required by a TextService (e.g.  
String BIND_TV_INPUT  
Must be required by a TvInputService to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_VISUAL_VOICEMAIL_SERVICE  
Must be required by a link VisualVoicemailService to ensure that only the system can bind to 
it.  
String BIND_VOICE_INTERACTION  
Must be required by a VoiceInteractionService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_VPN_SERVICE  
Must be required by a VpnService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_VR_LISTENER_SERVICE  
Must be required by an VrListenerService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BIND_WALLPAPER  
Must be required by a WallpaperService, to ensure that only the system can bind to it.  
String BLUETOOTH  
Allows applications to connect to paired bluetooth devices.  
String BLUETOOTH_ADMIN  
Allows applications to discover and pair bluetooth devices.  
String BLUETOOTH_PRIVILEGED  
Allows applications to pair bluetooth devices without user interaction, and to allow or 
disallow phonebook access or message access.  
String BODY_SENSORS  
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Allows an application to access data from sensors that the user uses to measure what is 
happening inside his/her body, such as heart rate.  
String BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REMOVED  
Allows an application to broadcast a notification that an application package has been 
removed.  
String BROADCAST_SMS  
Allows an application to broadcast an SMS receipt notification.  
String BROADCAST_STICKY  
Allows an application to broadcast sticky intents.  
String BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH  
Allows an application to broadcast a WAP PUSH receipt notification.  
String CALL_PHONE  
Allows an application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer user interface 
for the user to confirm the call.  
String CALL_PRIVILEGED  
Allows an application to call any phone number, including emergency numbers, without 
going through the Dialer user interface for the user to confirm the call being placed.  
String CAMERA  
Required to be able to access the camera device.  
String CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT  
Allows an application to capture audio output.  
String CAPTURE_SECURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT  
Allows an application to capture secure video output.  
String CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT  
Allows an application to capture video output.  
String CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE  
Allows an application to change whether an application component (other than its own) is 
enabled or not.  
String CHANGE_CONFIGURATION  
Allows an application to modify the current configuration, such as locale.  
String CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE  
Allows applications to change network connectivity state.  
String CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE  
Allows applications to enter Wi-Fi Multicast mode.  
String CHANGE_WIFI_STATE  
Allows applications to change Wi-Fi connectivity state.  
String CLEAR_APP_CACHE  
Allows an application to clear the caches of all installed applications on the device.  
String CONTROL_LOCATION_UPDATES  
Allows enabling/disabling location update notifications from the radio.  
String DELETE_CACHE_FILES  
Allows an application to delete cache files.  
String DELETE_PACKAGES  
Allows an application to delete packages.  
String DIAGNOSTIC  
Allows applications to RW to diagnostic resources.  
String DISABLE_KEYGUARD  
Allows applications to disable the keyguard if it is not secure.  
String DUMP  
Allows an application to retrieve state dump information from system services.  
String EXPAND_STATUS_BAR  
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Allows an application to expand or collapse the status bar.  
String FACTORY_TEST  
Run as a manufacturer test application, running as the root user.  
String GET_ACCOUNTS  
Allows access to the list of accounts in the Accounts Service.  
String GET_ACCOUNTS_PRIVILEGED  
Allows access to the list of accounts in the Accounts Service.  
String GET_PACKAGE_SIZE  
Allows an application to find out the space used by any package.  
String GET_TASKS  
This constant was deprecated in API level 21. No longer enforced.  
String GLOBAL_SEARCH  
This permission can be used on content providers to allow the global search system to 
access their data.  
String INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER  
Allows an application to install a location provider into the Location Manager.  
String INSTALL_PACKAGES  
Allows an application to install packages.  
String INSTALL_SHORTCUT  
Allows an application to install a shortcut in Launcher.  
String INSTANT_APP_FOREGROUND_SERVICE  
Allows an instant app to create foreground services.  
String INTERNET  
Allows applications to open network sockets.  
String KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES  
Allows an application to call killBackgroundProcesses(String).  
String LOCATION_HARDWARE  
Allows an application to use location features in hardware, such as the geofencing api.  
String MANAGE_DOCUMENTS  
Allows an application to manage access to documents, usually as part of a document picker.  
String MANAGE_OWN_CALLS  
Allows an application to manage its own calls, but rely on the system to route focus to the 
currently active call.  
String MASTER_CLEAR  
Not for use by third-party applications.  
String MEDIA_CONTENT_CONTROL  
Allows an application to know what content is playing and control its playback.  
String MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS  
Allows an application to modify global audio settings.  
String MODIFY_PHONE_STATE  
Allows modification of the telephony state - power on, mmi, etc.  
String MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS  
Allows formatting file systems for removable storage.  
String MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS  
Allows mounting and unmounting file systems for removable storage.  
String NFC  
Allows applications to perform I/O operations over NFC.  
String PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS  
Allows an application to collect component usage statistics  
Declaring the permission implies intention to use the API and the user of the device can 
grant permission through the Settings application.  
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String PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY  
This constant was deprecated in API level 9. This functionality will be removed in the future; 
please do not use. Allow an application to make its activities persistent.  
String PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS  
Allows an application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option 
to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether.  
String READ_CALENDAR  
Allows an application to read the user's calendar data.  
String READ_CALL_LOG  
Allows an application to read the user's call log.  
String READ_CONTACTS  
Allows an application to read the user's contacts data.  
String READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE  
Allows an application to read from external storage.  
String READ_FRAME_BUFFER  
Allows an application to take screen shots and more generally get access to the frame buffer 
data.  
String READ_INPUT_STATE  
This constant was deprecated in API level 16. The API that used this permission has been 
removed.  
String READ_LOGS  
Allows an application to read the low-level system log files.  
String READ_PHONE_NUMBERS  
Allows read access to the device's phone number(s).  
String READ_PHONE_STATE  
Allows read only access to phone state, including the phone number of the device, current 
cellular network information, the status of any ongoing calls, and a list of any 
PhoneAccounts registered on the device.  
String READ_SMS  
Allows an application to read SMS messages.  
String READ_SYNC_SETTINGS  
Allows applications to read the sync settings.  
String READ_SYNC_STATS  
Allows applications to read the sync stats.  
String READ_VOICEMAIL  
Allows an application to read voicemails in the system.  
String REBOOT  
Required to be able to reboot the device.  
String RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED  
Allows an application to receive the ACTION_BOOT_COMPLETED that is broadcast after the 
system finishes booting.  
String RECEIVE_MMS  
Allows an application to monitor incoming MMS messages.  
String RECEIVE_SMS  
Allows an application to receive SMS messages.  
String RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH  
Allows an application to receive WAP push messages.  
String RECORD_AUDIO  
Allows an application to record audio.  
String REORDER_TASKS  
Allows an application to change the Z-order of tasks.  
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String REQUEST_DELETE_PACKAGES  
Allows an application to request deleting packages.  
String REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS  
Permission an application must hold in order to use 
ACTION_REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS.  
String REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES  
Allows an application to request installing packages.  
String RESTART_PACKAGES  
This constant was deprecated in API level 8. The restartPackage(String) API is no longer 
supported.  
String RESTRICTED_VR_ACCESS  
Must be required by system apps when accessing restricted VR APIs.  
String RUN_IN_BACKGROUND  
Allows an app to run in the background.  
String SEND_RESPOND_VIA_MESSAGE  
Allows an application (Phone) to send a request to other applications to handle the respond-
via-message action during incoming calls.  
String SEND_SMS  
Allows an application to send SMS messages.  
String SET_ALARM  
Allows an application to broadcast an Intent to set an alarm for the user.  
String SET_ALWAYS_FINISH  
Allows an application to control whether activities are immediately finished when put in the 
background.  
String SET_ANIMATION_SCALE  
Modify the global animation scaling factor.  
String SET_DEBUG_APP  
Configure an application for debugging.  
String SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS  
This constant was deprecated in API level 7. No longer useful, see 
addPackageToPreferred(String) for details.  
String SET_PROCESS_LIMIT  
Allows an application to set the maximum number of (not needed) application processes 
that can be running.  
String SET_TIME  
Allows applications to set the system time.  
String SET_TIME_ZONE  
Allows applications to set the system time zone.  
String SET_WALLPAPER  
Allows applications to set the wallpaper.  
String SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS  
Allows applications to set the wallpaper hints.  
String SIGNAL_PERSISTENT_PROCESSES  
Allow an application to request that a signal be sent to all persistent processes.  
String STATUS_BAR  
Allows an application to open, close, or disable the status bar and its icons.  
String SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW  
Allows an app to create windows using the type TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY, shown on 
top of all other apps.  
String TRANSMIT_IR  
Allows using the device's IR transmitter, if available.  
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String UNINSTALL_SHORTCUT  
This permission is no longer supported.  
String UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS  
Allows an application to update device statistics.  
String USE_DATA_IN_BACKGROUND  
Allows an app to use data in the background.  
String USE_FINGERPRINT  
Allows an app to use fingerprint hardware.  
String USE_SIP  
Allows an application to use SIP service.  
String VIBRATE  
Allows access to the vibrator.  
String WAKE_LOCK  
Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from sleeping or screen from 
dimming.  
String WRITE_APN_SETTINGS  
Allows applications to write the apn settings.  
String WRITE_CALENDAR  
Allows an application to write the user's calendar data.  
String WRITE_CALL_LOG  
Allows an application to write (but not read) the user's call log data.  
String WRITE_CONTACTS  
Allows an application to write the user's contacts data.  
String WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE  
Allows an application to write to external storage.  
String WRITE_GSERVICES  
Allows an application to modify the Google service map.  
String WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS  
Allows an application to read or write the secure system settings.  
String WRITE_SETTINGS  
Allows an application to read or write the system settings.  
String WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS  
Allows applications to write the sync settings.  
String WRITE_VOICEMAIL  
Allows an application to modify and remove existing voicemails in the system.  
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